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ABSTRACT
In a closely watched 2021 ruling concerning a high school
student’s profane post on Snapchat, the Supreme Court declined to
shed significant light on the murky First Amendment status of speech
that K-12 students produce off campus, whether on social media or
elsewhere. Legal uncertainties concerning such speech afflict higher
education, as well. I focus on two dimensions of that uncertainty here.
First, many admissions officers say they look at college and university
applicants’ social-media posts when making their admissions decisions.
Yet only one federal appellate court has said anything at all about
whether the First Amendment restricts public postsecondary institutions’
ability to reject applicants because of their speech, and the court in
that case only addressed speech that applicants produce as part of the
admissions process. Second, there recently has been a spate of efforts
by professional schools (in pharmacy, medicine, dentistry, and the like)
to discipline students for speech that school officials believe violates
professional standards. Yet only a few federal courts have grappled
with the thorny First Amendment issues that such cases raise, and those
courts have not always agreed on how the constitutional analysis
should proceed.
In this Article, I tackle those and related matters by drawing lessons
from the comparatively well-developed First Amendment law of public
employment. Public employment and postsecondary education are
importantly different in some ways but usefully similar in others. Building
on the similarities, I provide analytic frameworks for determining when
the First Amendment bars admissions officers from rejecting applicants
because of their speech and when it bars professional schools from
disciplining students for speech that falls short of professional standards.
I also provide a lens for more deeply understanding the speech rights
of postsecondary students in curricular settings of all kinds.
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2021’s Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.,1 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a Pennsylvania high school violated
the First Amendment rights of one of its students—B.L.—when it punished
her for a weekend Snapchat post in which she profanely criticized the

1.
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school’s cheerleading program.2 The Third Circuit had held in B.L.’s favor,
reasoning that the rule famously announced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District3—allowing schools to restrict student expression
that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others”4—does not apply to speech uttered off school property.5

2. The student was Brandi Levy. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Rules for Cheerleader
Punished for Vulgar Snapchat Message, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://www.ny
times.com/2021/06/23/us/supreme-court-free-speech-cheerleader.html [https://perma.cc/
W926-4NYY]. Shortly after being denied a position on her school’s varsity cheerleading
squad (as well as her preferred position on a private softball team), Levy took to Snapchat
to vent her frustration. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2043. From a local convenience
store, she posted a photo of herself and a friend raising their middle fingers, with the caption
“Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” Id. School officials responded
by suspending Levy from the junior-varsity cheerleading squad for the coming year. Id.
3. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. Id. at 513.
5. B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 170, 189 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We hold
today that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech—that is, speech that is outside
school-owned, -operated, or -supervised channels and that is not reasonably interpreted as
bearing the school’s imprimatur.”), aff’d, 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021). School officials had
“argu[ed] that B.L.’s [social-media post] was likely to substantially disrupt the cheerleading
program.” Id. at 183. Because Tinker does not relate directly to the admissions- and
professionalism-related controversies that provoked this Article, I do not focus on it here.
Readers should be advised, however, that there is a continuing debate about whether
Tinker’s substantial-disruption standard applies in college and university settings. Some
courts have found that Tinker’s standard does apply, such that postsecondary schools may
discipline students for speech that violates it. See, e.g., Radwan v. Univ. of Conn. Bd. of
Trs., 465 F. Supp. 3d 75, 110 (D. Conn. 2020) (stating that “the principles of Tinker [apply]
to the college and university setting”). Other courts have been more skeptical. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 149 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 n.26 (E.D.
Va. 2016) (stating that “the Supreme Court’s post-Tinker jurisprudence casts some doubt
on whether Tinker and its progeny apply to post-secondary schools”). See generally Kelly
Sarabyn, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment: Resolving the Federal Circuit Split over College
Students’ First Amendment Rights, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 27, 44–49 (2008) (describing
courts’ disagreement about such matters). My own view is that the Third Circuit probably
hit close to the mark when it said that “the teachings of Tinker . . . cannot be taken as
gospel in cases involving public universities” and that “[a]ny application of free speech
doctrine derived from [Tinker] to the university setting should be scrutinized carefully,
with an emphasis on the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied.” McCauley v.
Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010).
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The Court affirmed B.L.’s victory,6 but on less categorical grounds. Led
by Justice Breyer, the Court found that schools do have reduced latitude
under Tinker to regulate speech that students produce away from school
premises,7 but it rejected the notion that “the special characteristics that
give schools additional license to regulate student speech always disappear
when a school regulates speech that takes place off campus.”8 To the
consternation of anyone who had hoped for significantly more guidance
than that,9 Justice Breyer “le[ft] for future cases to decide where, when,
and how . . . the speaker’s off-campus location will make the critical
difference.”10 The Court simply found that, taken together, the particulars
of B.L.’s case revealed a First Amendment violation.11

6. Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter. He argued that, under the law in place
at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, “[a] school can regulate speech
when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proximate tendency to harm the school, its
faculty or students, or its programs.” Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2061 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859)).
7. Justice Breyer identified three reasons why this is so: (1) “a school, in relation
to off-campus speech, will rarely stand in loco parentis”; (2) students would lose significant
speech freedom if they were under schools’ discipline-backed supervision twenty-four
hours per day; and (3) schools should be teaching students that our constitutional system
ordinarily protects the expression of “unpopular ideas.” Id. at 2046 (majority opinion).
8. Id. at 2045 (emphasis added).
9. Cf. id. at 2059 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority omits important detail.
What authority does a school have when it operates in loco parentis? How much less
authority do schools have over off-campus speech and conduct? And how does a court
decide if speech is on or off campus?”); id. at 2063 (“[C]ourts (and schools) will almost
certainly be at a loss as to what exactly the Court’s opinion today means.”); id. at 2059
(Alito, J., concurring) (“If today’s decision teaches any lesson, it must be that the regulation of
many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and
school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.”).
10. Id. at 2046 (majority opinion). In a concurrence joined by Justice Gorsuch,
Justice Alito endeavored to begin filling this jurisprudential gap. See id. at 2048–59 (Alito,
J., concurring). For a discussion and application of Justice Alito’s useful concurrence, see
infra notes 262–68 and accompanying text.
11. The Court cited numerous reasons for ruling in B.L.’s favor: her speech would
be protected if uttered by an adult; she spoke “outside of school hours from a location
outside the school”; she did not identify the school in her speech; she did not direct her
speech to school officials or any other particular members o f the school community; she
spoke “through a personal cellphone, to an audience consisting of her private circle of
Snapchat friends”; she “spoke under circumstances where the school did not stand in loco
parentis”; the discipline imposed on B.L. was not part of “any general effort to prevent
students from using vulgarity outside the classroom”; and there was no evidence that the
speech substantially interfered with the cheerleading program or any other school activity.
Id. at 2047–48.
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The constitutional landscape concerning students’ off-campus speech
—and even some varieties of on-campus speech—is no less hazy when
one shifts from K-12 settings to public higher education.12 Suppose B.L.
applies to a public college or university, for example, hoping to begin her
undergraduate studies there. And suppose admissions officers deny her
application because they learn about her profane Snapchat post and conclude
that she probably does not have the temperament of those they hope to
enroll. If B.L. discovered the reason for the officers’ decision, would she
have a viable First Amendment claim? In a 2017 ruling, the Fourth Circuit
held that the First Amendment gives applicants to public colleges and
universities no protection for statements they make in their admissions
interviews.13 But the court did not say whether the same rule would apply
for statements that applicants make outside the admissions process. In
any event, this remains the only federal appellate ruling on a question close
to the one raised by B.L.’s hypothetical application.
The First Amendment uncertainties are almost as stark when it comes
to postsecondary programs that train students for professions whose
practitioners are expected to adhere to specified ethical standards. Suppose,
for example, that B.L. had been a student in a program such as law, medicine,
or dentistry and that she publicly conveyed a comparably intemperate
message about that program or some other aspect of her life. And suppose
school officials disciplined B.L. because, in their judgment, her speech
violated the professionalism standards that govern those in the field for
which B.L. was training. How should the First Amendment analysis proceed?
The question is far from fanciful. In 2019 and 2020, for example, Kimberly
Diei ran into trouble with a disciplinary committee at the University of
Tennessee’s College of Pharmacy for her sexually provocative posts on

12. The Mahanoy Court said nothing about the free-speech rights of college and
university students. Cf. id. at 2049 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (“This case does not involve
speech by a student at a public college or university. For several reasons, including the age,
independence, and living arrangements of such students, regulation of their speech may
raise very different questions from those presented here. I do not understand the decision in
this case to apply to such students.”).
13. See Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2017); see also infra notes
40–56 and accompanying text (discussing Buxton).
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Instagram and Twitter.14 In 2020, Michael Brase—a student at the University
of Iowa’s College of Dentistry—was briefly slated for an appearance before
a disciplinary committee after he sent college-wide emails challenging his
dean’s condemnation of President Donald Trump’s ban on certain forms
of diversity training.15 In 2018, a disciplinary committee at the University
of Virginia’s School of Medicine voted to suspend a student based in large

14. See Matt Bruce, ‘Why Is the Attack on Me?’ Anonymous Complaints Lead to
University of Tennessee Grad Student Being Temporarily Expelled for Posting Rap Lyrics,
Lawsuit Ensues, ATLANTA BLACK STAR (Feb. 15, 2021), https://atlantablackstar.com/2021/
02/15/why-is-the-attack-on-me-anonymous-complaints-lead-to-university-of-tennesseegrad-student-being-temporarily-expelled-for-posting-rap-lyrics-lawsuit-ensues/ [https://
perma.cc/Y23W-643J] (describing Diei’s allegations and explaining that two of the posts
that got her into trouble concerned the sexually explicit song “WAP,” by Cardi B featuring
Megan Thee Stallion); Found. for Individual Rts. in Educ., Student to University of Tennessee:
‘Leave Me Alone,’ YOUTUBE (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AexHQ
15qi9w [https://perma.cc/E2JQ-MDNT] (interviewing Diei about why she filed a lawsuit
against her institution); Anemona Hartocollis, Students Punished for ‘Vulgar’ Social Media
Posts Are Fighting Back, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/
05/us/colleges-social-media-discipline.html [https://perma.cc/AH5C-VTFY] (reporting on
Diei’s lawsuit).
15. See Chris Quintana, Trump’s Controversial Diversity Training Order Is Dead
- or Is It? Colleges Are Still Feeling Its Effects, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2021, 1:15 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2021/02/06/biden-undid-trumps-diversitytraining-ban-but-its-alive-colleges/4380342001/ [https://perma.cc/7QAT-92BE] (recounting
the incident); Alexandra Skores, Email Thread Within the College of Dentistry Community
Sparks Debate, DAILY IOWAN (Oct. 26, 2020), https://dailyiowan.com/2020/10/27/emailthread-within-the-college-of-dentistry-community-sparks-debate/ [https://perma.cc/5FDHKL4P] (recounting the same); see also Exec. Order No. 13,950, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,683 (Sept.
22, 2020) (banning certain forms of diversity training by federal contractors and other
specified entities). The incident proved to be consequential. The state legislature held
hearings and ultimately produced legislation partly inspired by Brase’s experience. See
Cleo Krejci, ‘Unsafe Just Because They Disagree’: University of Iowa Dean Apologizes
for Infringing on Rights of Conservatives on Campus, DES MOINES REG. (Feb. 4, 2021,
10:58 AM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/education/2021/02/03/universityiowa-dentistry-dean-testifies-government-oversight-committee-apologizes-conservatives/
4353532001 [https://perma.cc/BRM2-7XK4] (reporting on the hearings); Vanessa Miller,
Iowa Universities Apologize for ‘Egregious’ Free Speech Errors, GAZETTE (Feb. 2, 2021,
6:26 PM), https://www.thegazette.com/education/iowa-universities-apologize-for-egregiousfree-speech-errors [https://perma.cc/6YY7-ZPXD] (reporting the same). The college’s dean
opted to retire one year earlier than he had planned. See Vanessa Miller, After Uproar,
University of Iowa Dentistry Dean Stepping Down Early, GAZETTE (Feb. 25, 2021, 8:47
PM), https://www.thegazette.com/education/after-uproar-university-of-iowa-dentistry-deanstepping-down-early/ [https://perma.cc/BWU9-T79E].
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part on the fact that he persisted with pointed questions during a schoolwide
faculty presentation about microaggressions.16
The nation’s courts have not yet coalesced around a roadmap for
navigating such terrain.17 The Tenth Circuit made precisely that point in its
2019 disposition of a claim brought by a student at the University of New
Mexico’s School of Medicine.18 Paul Hunt had gotten into trouble with
his school’s professionalism committee for declaring on Facebook that
Democrats are “sick, disgusting people” and “Moloch worshipping assholes,”
“WORSE than the Germans during WW2,” because they “support[] the
genocide against the unborn.”19 When Hunt filed suit alleging a violation
of his First Amendment rights, the defendants claimed qualified immunity.20
A qualified-immunity defense succeeds if either of two things is true: the
plaintiff’s factual allegations do not describe a violation of the plaintiff’s
rights or the rights claimed by the plaintiff were not “clearly
established . . . rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”21
Courts can take those two questions up in whichever order they think
appropriate, and they need not address the question they slot second if
the defense succeeds on the question they slot first.22 The Tenth Circuit
16. Bhattacharya v. Murray, 515 F. Supp. 3d 436, 444–50 (W.D. Va. 2021). The
district court concluded that further development of the record was needed to determine
whether university officials truly had professionalism concerns chiefly in mind when they
expelled a medical student because he had verbally sparred with professors at a faculty
panel discussion and elsewhere. Id. at 458–59.
17. See Mark P. Strasser, Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the
Constitution, 68 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 97, 157 (2017) (“Courts simply do not know what
standard to use when judging whether dismissals of university students from professional
programs pass muster, which means that relevantly similar cases will be decided in light
of different First Amendment tests depending upon the circuit.”).
18. Hunt v. Bd. of Regents, 792 F. App’x 595 (10th Cir. 2019).
19. Id. at 598.
20. See id. at 599–600.
21. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (explaining the two-step process of “resolving government
officials’ qualified immunity claims”).
22. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236–42 (finding that the sequence of the two-step
process “should no longer be regarded as mandatory” and that judges should have “discretion
in deciding which of the two prongs . . . should be addressed first”); id. at 237 (“There are
cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from
obvious whether in fact there is such a right.”); see also Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692,
705 (2011) (“[A] court can often avoid ruling on the plaintiff’s claim that a particular right

235

PETTYS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2022 3:18 PM

chose to steer clear of trying to determine whether Hunt’s allegations described
a First Amendment violation. “Off-campus, online speech by university
students, particularly those in professional schools, involves an emerging
area of constitutional law,” the court wrote.23 Rather than venture into that
uncertain territory, the court ruled for the defendants on the grounds that
existing case law had not “sent sufficiently clear signals to reasonable
medical school administrators that sanctioning a student’s off-campus, online
speech for the purpose of instilling professional norms is unconstitutional.”24
In this Article, I aim to bring greater clarity to the First Amendment’s
requirements in these higher-education settings. For guidance, I turn to
well-established First Amendment principles that govern the realm of public
employment. Let me emphasize at the outset that there are important differences
between ordinary governmental employers and public institutions of higher
education, on the one hand, and between public employees and postsecondary
students, on the other. Most significantly, broad freedom of expression is
plainly central to the missions of colleges and universities in ways that it
is not in ordinary governmental offices.25 I do not argue that the First
Amendment gives public employees and postsecondary students equal
measures of free-speech protection. But I do contend that thinking about
how courts have resolved free-speech controversies in public-employment
settings can help us think more clearly about how to define the First
Amendment speech rights of aspiring and enrolled postsecondary students
at important steps in their educational careers.
I proceed as follows: In Part II, I first discuss what courts have said about
whether the First Amendment constrains the ability of public undergraduate,
graduate, and professional programs to deny applications for admission
because of the applicants’ speech. I then examine what courts have said
about two doctrinally interrelated matters: the circumstances in which the
Speech Clause permits public postsecondary schools to regulate student
speech in curricular settings of any kind and the degree to which it allows
public professional schools to regulate student speech that school leaders
deem unprofessional. In Part III, drawing insights from courts’ construction
of the First Amendment doctrines that define public employees’ speech
rights, I propose ways courts should build out the First Amendment principles
that apply in several postsecondary domains. Those domains are each
exists. If prior case law has not clearly settled the right, . . . [t]he court need never decide
whether the plaintiff’s claim, even though novel or otherwise unsettled, in fact has merit.”).
23. Hunt, 792 F. App’x at 601.
24. Id. at 605.
25. See infra notes 199–204 and accompanying text.
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unique in some ways but, when we view them through the public-employment
lens that I deploy here, we find analytic threads that usefully join them.
Part IV briefly wraps up the discussion by enumerating the Article’s chief
conclusions.
II. THE CURRENT LAY OF THE LAND
In 1957, Justice Frankfurter wrote that there are “four essential freedoms
of a university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted
to study.”26 Justice Powell repeated that formulation in his influential
opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke27—adding that
these four freedoms are “a special concern of the First Amendment”28—
and he invoked it again when writing for the Court in Widmar v. Vincent.29
When it comes to resolving First Amendment disputes between public
institutions of higher education and their students, however, these four
freedoms certainly do not tell the whole story. Students, after all, are “a
special concern of the First Amendment” too.30 The trick is to determine
how to reconcile one set of interests with the other.
Here in Part II, I describe the current state of the law regarding three
different occasions when the interests of public postsecondary schools
collide with the interests of those schools’ prospective or current students:
when a college or university denies admission to an applicant because of
26. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result) (quoting CONF. OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN
AND THE UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–
12 (1957)).
27. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325
(2003) (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell’s view [in Bakke] that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”).
28. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
29. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234,
263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)). Widmar held that a public university
violated the Speech Clause when it barred a religious student group from conducting
meetings in university facilities. See id. at 276–77.
30. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
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his or her speech; when a college or university responds adversely to student
speech in a curricular setting; and when a student in a professional-degree
program is disciplined for speech—even if not uttered in a conventional
curricular setting—because program leaders deem the speech unprofessional.
The second of those three is important in its own right, of course, but I
cover it here because of the foundation it lays for thinking about the
speech-regulating powers of professional schools.
A. Responding Adversely to Applicants’ Speech
Imagine two individuals, X and Y, who apply for admission to a public
university. In her application materials, X makes statements that university
officials find socially objectionable, so they reject her application. Y applies
to the same school and submits materials that officials find satisfactory.
But then those officials look at Y’s Facebook page, where Y has posted
statements that the officials find socially objectionable, so they deny his
bid for admission as well. Do X and Y have viable Speech Clause claims?
The Supreme Court’s closest brush with such questions came in 2004’s
Locke v. Davey.31 Joshua Davey’s primary claim was that the State of
Washington violated his rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause when it declared him ineligible for a state scholarship program
because he was majoring in pastoral ministries.32 Although that is the
claim for which the case is best known, it was not Davey’s sole constitutional
contention. Relying on Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University
of Virginia,33 he also argued that the state’s refusal to help pay for his
ministerial studies amounted to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.34
Rosenberger held that the University of Virginia (UVA) created a limited
public forum when it established a fund to help pay costs incurred by
student organizations, and that school officials violated the Speech Clause
when they refused to use money from that fund to help pay the costs of
printing a Christian student group’s publication.35 Speech restrictions in
limited public forums are permissible only if they are reasonable and

31. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
32. Id. at 717–18. The Court rejected Davey’s claim and reasoned that “[the
Court] . . . cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction
alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.” Id. at 725.
33. Rosenberger v. Rectors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
34. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3. He also advanced an equal-protection argument,
which the Court rejected. Id.
35. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–37.

238

PETTYS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 229, 2022]

5/18/2022 3:18 PM

Constructing Students’ Speech Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

viewpoint neutral, 36 and UVA officials had discriminated against the
Christian group precisely because of the religious viewpoint it wished to
express.37
Davey believed his case presented the same First Amendment problem,
but the Court swiftly rejected that argument. Government property—
whether tangible like a conference room or intangible like a scholarship
fund—becomes a limited public forum for free expression only if that is
what the government intends to create.38 Therein lay the defect in Davey’s
Speech Clause claim:
[Washington’s] Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech. The
purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is to assist students from low- and
middle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to
“encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.” Our cases dealing with
speech forums are simply inapplicable.39

If a student’s free-speech complaint today is that a public institution
regards certain kinds of expressive activities or viewpoints as ineligible
for financial aid, Locke thus leaves the student with little ground to stand
on, absent evidence that the government created the given funding source
for the purpose of facilitating student expression. But what if Washington
officials had rejected Davey’s request for scholarship assistance because
he made statements—either in his scholarship application or out in the
larger world—that state officials found objectionable? Or suppose Davey
had applied for admission to the University of Washington but was rejected

36. See id. at 829–30.
37. See id. at 831.
38. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009) (“We have held
that a government entity may create ‘a designated public forum’ if government property
that has not traditionally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened up for
that purpose.” (emphasis added)); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
680 (1998) (“[W]ith the exception of traditional public fora, the government retains the
choice of whether to designate its property as a forum for specified classes of speakers.”);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 803 (1985) (“Not every
instrumentality used for communication . . . is a traditional public forum or a public forum
by designation . . . . We will not find that a public forum has been created in the face of
clear evidence of a contrary intent.”) (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civil Ass’ns., 453 U.S. 114, 129, 130 n.6 (1981))).
39. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (quoting United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n., 539 U.S.
194, 206 (2003) (plurality opinion)).
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due to university officials’ objection to his statements, whether made in his
application materials (like our X) or elsewhere (like our Y). Would Davey
have a plausible free-speech claim then?
The only federal appellate ruling that speaks squarely to a factual
scenario of that sort is the Fourth Circuit’s 2017 decision in Buxton v.
Kurtinitis.40 Dustin Buxton applied for admission to the radiation therapy
program at the Community College of Baltimore County, and as part of
the application process he was interviewed by school officials.41 In his
interview, Buxton reportedly expressed some of his religious beliefs about
death, prompting at least one member of the interview committee to worry
that Buxton would inappropriately speak about religion in clinical settings.42
After the school denied Buxton’s application, he filed a lawsuit alleging
First Amendment retaliation.43
To prevail on a retaliation claim, Buxton was required to prove that “(1)
[he] ‘engaged in protected First Amendment activity,’ (2) ‘the defendants
took some action that adversely affected [his] First Amendment rights,’
and (3) ‘there was a causal relationship between [his] protected activity
and the defendants’ conduct.’”44 Could Buxton get past the first of those
three elements by showing that the Speech Clause protected his statements
in the interview? The Supreme Court’s ruling in Locke foreclosed any
finding that the interview was a limited public forum: the interview’s purpose
was to help college officials evaluate Buxton’s fitness for the radiation
therapy program, rather than to provide Buxton with a venue for free

40. Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2017). The Southern District of
New York embraced Buxton’s reasoning in Weiss v. City University of New York, No. 17CV-3557, 2019 WL 1244508 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019); see infra note 53. Remarkably,
the same college and program whose officials were sued in Buxton had previously been
sued by a different plaintiff on precisely the same grounds—namely, that officials denied
the plaintiff’s application for admission by unconstitutionally relying upon statements
made by the plaintiff about religion in his admissions interview. See Jenkins v. Kurtinitis,
No. ELH-14-01346, 2015 WL 1285355 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2015). In Jenkins, the plaintiff
told his interviewers that he was pursuing a career in radiation therapy because he believed
that is what God wanted him to do. Id. at *3–4. The Jenkins court rejected the plaintiff’s
free-speech claim on grounds that closely resemble those later invoked by the Fourth
Circuit in Buxton. See id. at *12–25.
41. See Buxton, 862 F.3d at 425.
42. See id. at 426.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 427 (quoting Constantine v. Rectors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d
474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005)).
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expression.45 Were there other reasons to conclude that Buxton enjoyed
the Speech Clause’s protection when he spoke to the interview committee?
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the best fit for answering that
question was a line of Supreme Court cases involving “situations where
the competitive nature of the process in question inherently requires the
government to make speech-based distinctions.”46 In National Endowment
for the Arts v. Finley, the Court determined that, when allocating scarce
financial resources for artistic projects, the government must have wide
latitude to make content-based judgments about grant applicants’ artistic
merits.47 In Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,48 the
Court observed that “[p]ublic and private broadcasters alike are not only
permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial editorial discretion
in the selection and presentation of their programming.”49 And in United
States v. American Library Association,50 a plurality of the Court found

45. See id. at 428 (noting Locke’s irrelevance); see also id. (finding that forum
analysis was inapt because “the public forum cases deal with the government restricting
access to a forum—i.e., preventing the speech from happening altogether”); supra notes
31–39 and accompanying text (discussing Locke).
46. Buxton, 862 F.3d at 428. The Ninth Circuit relied on the same line of cases in
Association of Christian Schools International v. Stearns, 362 F. App’x 640, 643 (9th Cir.
2010). The Stearns court rejected a Speech Clause claim brought by religious high schools
who objected to California officials’ refusal to treat certain religious courses as ones that
prepared students for admission to a University of California institution. See id. (“The
Supreme Court has rejected heightened scrutiny where, as here, the government provides
a public service that, by its nature, requires evaluations of and distinctions based on the
content of speech.”). The district court had relied upon that same rationale, concluding
that there was no free-speech violation so long as California officials’ course-screening
policy was “rationally related to the goal of selecting the most qualified students for
admission. . . .” Ass’n of Christian Schs. Int’l v. Stearns, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1098
(C.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d, 362 F. App’x 640 (9th Cir. 2010).
47. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585–86 (1998); see
also id. at 585 (“The ‘very assumption’ of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according to
the ‘artistic worth of competing applications,’ and absolute neutrality is simply ‘inconceivable.’”
(quoting Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1976))).
48. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
49. Id. at 673; see also id. (“As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion
counsels against subjecting broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination.”).
50. United States v. Am. Libr. Ass’n., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
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that the First Amendment gives public libraries “broad discretion” to make
content-based decisions about what to include in their collections.51
The Fourth Circuit found that the same discretion is essential when a
public college or university uses competitive interviews to narrow the pool of
applicants eligible for one of its academic programs.
As is inherent in any competitive interview process, this narrowing requires
distinctions to be made based on the speech—including the content and viewpoint
—of the interviewee. Indeed, for an interview process to have any efficacy at all,
distinctions based on the content, and even the viewpoint, of the interviewee’s
speech during the interview is required.52

The court thus drew a bright-line conclusion: when it comes to statements
made in competitive interviews for seats in postsecondary programs, the
Speech Clause gives applicants no protection whatsoever.53 The Constitution
does not leave admissions officers free to invidiously discriminate against
interviewees, the court said, but those constitutional constraints come from
texts other than the Speech Clause. 54 So far as the Speech Clause and
statements made by applicants as part of the admissions process are
concerned, a public postsecondary institution’s freedom “to determine for

51. Id. at 205 (plurality opinion). The plurality thus found that Congress had not
impermissibly induced public libraries to violate the First Amendment when it said that
public libraries could receive federal funds to help pay the costs of providing internet
services only if they installed software that blocked their internet terminals from giving
patrons access to obscenity and child pornography. See id. at 214.
52. Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 430 (4th Cir. 2017).
53. Id. Finding Buxton persuasive, the Southern District of New York reached the
same conclusion in Weiss v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 17-CV-3557, 2019 WL 1244508,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019). After being denied admission to a program at Hunter
College, Faigy Rachel Weiss alleged that admissions officials had impermissibly relied on
statements she made during her admissions interview. Id. at *8. Relying squarely on
Buxton, the district court held that “speech made in connection with a college admissions
application is not protected under the First Amendment.” Id. at *9. Although the Fourth
Circuit and the Southern District of New York both categorically rejected the possibility
of Speech Clause claims in this context, the District of Maryland in earlier litigation left
open the possibility that the Speech Clause might provide at least some measure of
protection for admissions-interview statements on matters of public concern. See Jenkins
v. Kurtinitis, No. ELH-14-01346, 2015 WL 1285355, at *23–24 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2015),
aff’d sub nom. Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2017); see also supra note 40
(noting the Jenkins litigation).
54. See Buxton, 862 F.3d at 430–31 (citing the Equal Protection Clause as a source
of constitutional protection against invidious discrimination).
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itself . . . who may be admitted to study”55 is absolute. Buxton’s claim failed
accordingly.56
For our X, therefore—the applicant who is denied admission because of
something she said in her application materials—the Fourth Circuit’s
approach leaves her with no recourse under the Speech Clause. But what
about Y? Does the clause constrain school officials’ ability to make an
adverse admissions decision based on statements Y made outside the application
process, whether on Facebook, on Twitter, or elsewhere?
Courts have not yet spoken to that question—a fact that is not altogether
surprising, since schools do not routinely tell unsuccessful applicants all
the reasons for their rejections.57 The inquiry, however, is not an idle one.
Across the country, many admissions officers say they examine applicants’
social media posts and sometimes reject applicants based on what they
find there.58 In those instances, the Finley-inspired rationale on which the
55. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result) (quoting CONF. OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN AND THE
UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (1957));
see also supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing this influential passage from
Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Sweezy).
56. See Buxton, 862 F.3d at 431.
57. One university president indicated that he believed rejecting an applicant on
these grounds would violate the First Amendment. In curious tension with that conclusion,
however, he also indicated that he would admit applicants who had produced troubling
speech only if they agreed to obtain “additional education and special training to assist
them in both understanding the impact of their actions and in developing cultural competence.”
See Clif Smart, Balancing Rights and Responsibilities When Our Values Are Offended,
MO. STATE: PRESIDENTIAL UPDATES (June 2, 2020), https://blogs.missouristate.edu/president/
2020/06/02/balancing-rights-and-responsibilities-when-our-values-are-offended/ [https://
perma.cc/V84W-UWGK].
58. See Clay Calvert, Rescinding Admission Offers in Higher Education: The Clash
Between Free Speech and Institutional Academic Freedom When Prospective Students’
Racist Posts Are Exposed, 68 UCLA L. REV. & DISCOURSE 282, 289–90 (2020) (citing
Scott Jaschik, Admissions Offers Revoked Over Racist Comments, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June
22, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/2020/06/22/colleges-reverseadmissions-offers [https://perma.cc/PYP2-P3QT]) (“27 percent of admission directors
at public universities surveyed agreed that it was appropriate to consider social media posts
when making admissions decisions.”)); Frank D. LoMonte & Courtney Shannon, Admissions
Against Pinterest: The First Amendment Implications of Reviewing College Applicants’
Social Media Speech, 49 HOFSTRA L. REV. 773, 796 (2021) (citing Kaplan Test Prep Survey:
Percentage of College Admissions Officers Who Check Out Applicants’ Social Media
Profiles Hits New High; Triggers Including Special Talents, Competitive Sabotage,
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Buxton court relied weakens greatly and might even vanish entirely. True,
the government is still allocating a limited number of seats and must
identify winners and losers in a competitive applicant pool. Reviewing
applicants’ social-media posts might even help school officials identify
the qualities that applicants would bring to the campus community. But
in circumstances like Y’s, applicants are not making their statements for
the purpose of winning a seat in a school’s program. And examining
statements that prospective students make outside their application materials
is not an inescapable part of the selection process: admissions staff could
simply limit their review to the materials that applicants competitively
submit for evaluation. Where courts will draw the First Amendment lines
in circumstances like these remains an open question.
B. Regulating Students’ Curricular Speech
Unlike our X and Y, of course, many people successfully run the
admissions gauntlet and enroll in public institutions’ academic programs.
Those students bring robust First Amendment protection with them to campus.
As the Supreme Court explained half a century ago, its “precedents . . . leave no
room for the view that, because of the acknowledged need for order, First
Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large.”59 But no one’s speech rights are absolute.
Public postsecondary schools need not tolerate speech that amounts to
incitement, threats, or other established species of unprotected expression,
for example, any more than the government must tolerate those forms of
speech beyond academia’s walls.60 The question, for our purposes, is

(Jan. 13, 2016, 10:07 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2
0160113005780/en/Kaplan-Test-Prep-Survey-Percentage-of-College-Admissions-OfficersWho-Check-Out-Applicants’-Social-Media-Profiles-Hits-New-High-Triggers-IncludeSpecial-Talents-Competitive-Sabotage [https://perma.cc/RJ8J-TYKL]). LoMonte and Shannon
stop short of taking a constitutional position on the practice, but they do argue “that it is a
bad idea.” Id. at 817.
59. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972); see also Papish v. Univ. of Mo. Curators,
410 U.S. 667, 667–68, 671 (1973) (per curiam) (stating that “the First Amendment leaves
no room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with respect to
the content of speech” and overturning a state university’s expulsion of a journalism
student who distributed a newspaper containing the word “mother-fucker” and depicting
police officers raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice); infra notes 199–
204 and accompanying text (elaborating on the importance of free expression in college
communities).
60. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of University Students, 101
MINN. L. REV. 1801, 1820–23 (2017) (discussing categories of unprotected expression).
BUSINESSWARE
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how courts have defined the circumstances in which the government
has broad latitude to regulate college and university students’ curricular
speech. That question is clearly significant in its own right, but my chief
aim in covering it here is to set the stage for the ensuing discussion of the
speech rights of students in professional schools.
Courts’ prevailing answer to the curricular-speech question begins with
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,61 a well-known K-12 ruling that
has cast a long shadow in the postsecondary realm. In Hazelwood, the
student authors of a high school newspaper alleged a violation of the First
Amendment when their principal refused to let them publish stories
profiling classmates who were pregnant or whose parents were divorced.62
The Court rejected the students’ claim.63 Writing for the majority, Justice
White explained that the First Amendment gives K-12 school officials
exceptionally broad authority to regulate student speech in curricular
contexts. 64 This includes not only speech “in a traditional classroom
setting,” but also speech in faculty-supervised “publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities” that are designed to teach
knowledge or skills and that a person “might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school.”65 The Court concluded that, to satisfy the
First Amendment, schools’ treatment of student speech in these curricular
contexts need only be “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.”66 That is, the First Amendment permits courts to intervene only
61. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
62. Id. at 262–63.
63. In the first part of its analysis, the Court found that the newspaper was not a public
forum. Id. at 267–70. Lower courts have sometimes distinguished college newspapers and
yearbooks on these grounds. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (concluding that Kentucky State University’s yearbook was a limited
public forum); id. at 346 n.5 (distinguishing Hazelwood on these grounds); Student Gov’t Ass’n
v. Bd. of Trs., 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (distinguishing college newspapers from
the newspaper in Hazelwood on forum grounds).
64. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 272–73 (“[W]e conclude that the standard
articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need
not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of student expression.”); see also supra notes 3–5
and accompanying text (noting the Tinker standard).
65. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 271. For a discussion of the Court’s use of
the term “imprimatur,” see infra note 234.
66. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
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when a school’s curricular speech regulations serve “no valid educational
purpose.”67 Giving school personnel such broad authority is necessary,
Justice White wrote, to ensure that students “learn whatever lessons the
activity is designed to teach,” students “are not exposed to material that may
be inappropriate for their level of maturity,” and “the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”68
Because teachers supervised the students who worked on the school
newspaper in Hazelwood, and because students performed that work as
part of their duties in one of the school’s journalism courses, the Court
found that the students’ articles fell easily within the curricular realm. 69
The First Amendment thus permitted school officials to regulate the contents
of those articles “in any reasonable manner.”70 The Court had no difficulty
finding that the principal met that permissive standard when he refused to
let his students publish their stories on pregnancy and divorce.71
The Hazelwood Court reserved judgment on whether the standard it set
for K-12 students’ curricular speech is also “appropriate with respect to
school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level.”72
The justices have not yet returned to that question. Among lower courts,
there initially was some disagreement about the appropriate answer, but an
apparent consensus has now emerged.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 271.
69. See id. at 268–70.
70. Id. at 270; see also id. at 273 (stating that the principal’s censorship of the student
authors’ curricular speech would be impermissible only if it served “no valid educational
purpose”).
71. The school principal feared that the identity of the students anonymously
profiled in the disputed articles would become known and was worried that the stories
would invade the privacy of the profiled students’ families. Id. at 274–76. The principal
believed the stories were inappropriate for some of the school’s young freshmen and for
some students’ even younger siblings who might read the stories at home. Id. at 274–75.
72. Id. at 273 n.7. The Court distinguished its ruling in Papish v. Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam). In Papish, the Court ruled
that the University of Missouri could not bar a graduate student from distributing on
campus a newspaper containing (among other things) “a political cartoon . . . depicting
policemen raping the Statute of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.” Id. at 667; see also
id. at 670 (“[T]he mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—
on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of
decency.’”). The Hazelwood Court pointed out that the newspaper in Papish was “an offcampus ‘underground’ newspaper,” not one “sponsored by the school.” Hazelwood Sch.
Dist., 484 U.S. at 271 n.3.
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The Ninth Circuit’s 2002 ruling in Brown v. Li73 illustrates the early
disagreement. When filing his master’s thesis at the University of
California at Santa Barbara, Christopher Brown insisted on including a
“Disacknowledgements” section in which he “offer[ed] special Fuck You’s”
to the dean and other university employees he regarded as “degenerates”
and “an ever-present hindrance during [his] graduate career.”74 He sued
on First Amendment grounds after university officials—breaking from
their usual practice—refused to file the completed thesis in the school
library.75 The Ninth Circuit panel split on whether the case should be
deemed governed by Hazelwood. Announcing the judgment of the court,
Judge Graber contended that Hazelwood did provide the proper “standard
of review for reviewing a university’s assessment of a student’s academic
work,”76 and that the university’s refusal to file Brown’s thesis in the library
“was reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective: teaching
[Brown] the proper format for a scientific paper.”77 Judge Reinhardt rejected
that line of thinking, arguing that applying Hazelwood would give university
officials far more power than is suitable for a domain in which students
are more mature and “academic freedom and vigorous debate are supposed
to flourish.”78 Although stopping short of committing to an alternative
standard,79 he suggested that “an intermediate level of scrutiny” might be
appropriate.80
73. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 943.
75. Id. at 945–46.
76. Id. at 949 (opinion of Graber, J.).
77. Id. at 952.
78. Id. at 957 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Bd. of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 238 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“Our . . . cases dealing with the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive
freedom of students have been confined to high schools, whose students and their schools’
relation to them are different and at least arguably distinguishable from their counterparts
in college education.” (citations omitted)).
79. Judge Reinhardt did not have to commit to a particular test because he believed
that, even if Hazelwood provided the appropriate standard, there was a trial-necessitating
“question of material fact about whether the university was motivated, not by its asserted
pedagogical purposes, but by a desire to punish Brown for the viewpoint he sought to
express.” Brown, 308 F.3d at 965 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (discussing pretext cases).
80. Brown, 308 F.3d at 964 (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The divide between Judge Graber’s and Judge Reinhardt’s approaches
is not as wide as it might first appear. A court can say that Hazelwood
applies in postsecondary settings yet take account of the students’ ages
and the overall curricular context when determining whether a speech
regulation is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”81
Perhaps for that reason, most courts addressing the issue have concluded
that, for public colleges and universities, Hazelwood does indeed provide
the proper framework for evaluating curricular speech regulations aimed
at achieving pedagogical goals. In Hosty v. Carter,82 for example, the
Seventh Circuit concluded “that Hazelwood’s framework applies to subsidized
student newspapers at colleges,” but explained that the students’ ages
should “come into play” when evaluating “the reasonableness of the asserted
pedagogical justification.”83 The Tenth Circuit reasoned similarly in
Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, a case in which faculty members in the University
of Utah’s Actor Training Program insisted that, during classroom acting
exercises, a student set aside her objections to uttering words like “fuck”
and “Christ.”84 The court said the classroom requirement was permissible
under the Speech Clause if it was reasonably related to legitimate teaching
objectives, understanding that the “[a]ge, maturity, and sophistication level
of the students” should be considered when deciding whether that standard
has been met.85
81. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (emphases
added); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“By requiring restrictions on
student speech to be ‘reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,’ Hazelwood allows
teachers and administrators to account for the ‘level of maturity’ of the student. Although
it may be reasonable for a principal to delete a story about teenage pregnancy from a high
school newspaper, the same could not (likely) be said about a college newspaper.”
(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271, 274–75)); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st
Cir. 1993) (“It stands to reason that whether a regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns will depend on, among other things, the age and sophistication of
the students, the relationship between teaching method and valid educational objective,
and the context and manner of the presentation.”).
82. Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005), superseded by statute, College
Campus Press Act, 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. 13/1–13/97 (2008).
83. Id. at 734–35; see also id. at 734 (“To the extent that the justification for editorial
control [over a student newspaper] depends on the audience’s maturity, the difference between
high school and university students may be important.”).
84. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004).
85. Id. at 1289; see also id. (“[W]e hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable
in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”).
The Tenth Circuit continued its reliance on Hazelwood in Pompeo v. Board of Regents of
the University of New Mexico, 852 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 2017), holding that Hazelwood
provided the proper standard for determining whether a professor violated a university
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Even when courts take account of students’ maturity and other differences
between K-12 and postsecondary schools, however, there is no doubt that
Hazelwood’s standard remains deferential. In Collins v. Putt,86 for example,
the Second Circuit applied Hazelwood when evaluating a college professor’s
decision to remove comments that a student had posted on a college-hosted
message board as part of a class assignment. The court said it had “no doubt”
that the professor made a reasonable pedagogical decision when she concluded
that the student’s post inappropriately focused on critiquing, rather than
completing, the assignment.87 In O’Neal v. Falcon,88 the Western District of
Texas applied Hazelwood to a college student’s complaint that her
communications professor would not let her choose abortion as the topic
for her required class speech. The court readily found that the professor had
a legitimate pedagogical reason for deeming that topic out of bounds.89
Deference in cases such as these is precisely what the Supreme Court (in
a different context) has indicated we should expect: “When judges are
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, . . . they
should show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”90
But because not all faculty decisions are “genuinely academic decision[s],”91
deference is not automatic. Courts sometimes probe beneath the surface
of educators’ asserted pedagogical justifications to see whether those
justifications are merely smokescreens for something else.92 In Axsonstudent’s First Amendment rights by demanding that she avoid calling lesbianism “perverse”
in a paper unless she provided support for that claim. Id. at 985.
86. Collins v. Putt, 979 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1465
(2021).
87. Id. at 134.
88. O’Neal v. Falcon, 668 F. Supp. 2d 979 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
89. Id. at 985–87. The court said the professor could reasonably fear that the topic
of abortion would be so controversial that students would be distracted from learning how
to give effective speeches. See id. at 986.
90. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (citing Bd. of
Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)) (adjudicating a
substantive due process dispute); cf. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 115
(2013) (arguing that courts should leave universities free to judge the merits of students’
speech).
91. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 (emphasis added).
92. The path that courts take in these instances depends on the reasons for the
government’s speech-restricting actions. If a court finds that instructors restricted a student’s
speech because they were hostile to his or her religion, for example, the court will apply
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Flynn, for example, the Tenth Circuit remanded for trial because there was
evidence indicating that perhaps hostility to the plaintiff’s religion—
rather than a desire to achieve pedagogical goals—lay beneath the theater
professors’ insistence that the student set aside her objection to uttering
certain words during classroom acting exercises.93 In 2019’s Felkner v.
Rhode Island College, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island said a trial was
necessary to determine whether faculty members in a social-work program
treated a master’s student adversely in order to achieve pedagogical ends
(as they claimed) or whether their proffered explanation was merely a
pretext for discriminating against the student because of his politically
conservative views.94
C. Responding Adversely to Students’ Unprofessional Speech
Bearing Hazelwood’s broad influence in mind, we can turn now to what
courts have said about the First Amendment’s requirements when public
professional schools discipline students on the grounds that their speech
is unprofessional. As the Tenth Circuit noted when adjudicating Paul Hunt’s
dispute with officials at the University of New Mexico’s School of Medicine,95
the law here remains uncertain. But the slate is not blank. I describe the

the analysis required by the Free Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356
F.3d 1277, 1292–93 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that it was premature to defer to the
instructors pursuant to Hazelwood, because further factual development could reveal a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause); see also supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text
(discussing Axson-Flynn). If a school’s adverse response to student speech is especially
severe, it can be a sign that a school’s proffered pedagogical justifications for restricting
the speech are indeed pretextual and that non-pedagogical objectives are at play. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 958 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The university’s extreme actions in response to Brown’s speech . . . raises
[sic] a genuine question of material fact as to whether the university punished him because
of the viewpoint he sought to express or whether . . . it simply desired to further a
legitimate pedagogical concern.”).
93. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293; see also id. at 1292–93 (“Although we do not
second-guess the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator’s goal, we would be
abdicating our judicial duty if we failed to investigate whether the educational goal or
pedagogical concern was pretextual.” (footnote omitted)).
94. See Felkner v. R.I. Coll., 203 A.3d 433, 441, 449–50 (R.I. 2019); see also id. at
450 (“[G]enuine issues of material fact exist as to whether defendants’ justifications for
their actions were truly pedagogical or whether they were pretextual.”). William Felkner,
a “conservative libertarian,” had frequently butted heads with faculty in Rhode Island College’s
School of Social Work. See id. at 433–44.
95. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text (discussing Hunt v. Bd. of
Regents, 792 F. App’x 595 (10th Cir. 2019)).
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leading cases in two groups: those involving speech in conventional curricular
settings and those involving speech in the larger world.
1. Speech in Conventional Curricular Settings
When it comes to speech in the classroom and other conventional curricular
contexts, courts have readily applied Hazelwood’s framework to disputes
about student speech and professionalism, finding no reason to treat
schools’ professionalism-focused pedagogical objectives any differently
than they treat the teaching objectives of other academic units on campus.
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley96 illustrates the
point. Faculty in a counseling program at Augusta State University grew
concerned that Jennifer Keeton, one of their master’s students, might violate
the American Counseling Association’s ethics code, because—both in and
out of the classroom—she had told professors and classmates that she
would try to convert her homosexual clients to heterosexuality.97 Keeton
filed a First Amendment claim after school officials told her she could not
remain in the program unless she attended cultural-competency sessions
and took a variety of other remedial steps.98 The Eleventh Circuit rejected
Keeton’s free-speech claim, finding that school officials had a legitimate
pedagogical goal: teaching Keeton to comply with the counseling profession’s
ethical requirements.99
The Sixth Circuit deployed the same analytic strategy when facing a
factually comparable dispute the following year in Ward v. Polite.100 In a
counseling practicum course at Eastern Michigan University, master’s
student Julea Ward asked an instructor to assign a gay client to another
student because she (Ward) could not affirm the client’s interest in samesex relationships.101 School officials expelled Ward from the program, finding
that her stance violated the American Counseling Association’s ethics code.102
Writing for the Sixth Circuit panel, Judge Sutton found that Hazelwood

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 868–69.
Id. at 869–71.
See id. at 876.
Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 741 (6th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 729–30.
Id. at 730–32.
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provided the appropriate starting point because it “respects the latitude
[that] educational institutions—at any level—must have to further legitimate
curricular objectives.”103
If professionalism-focused speech restrictions are not grounded in
pedagogical justifications, however, courts might apply a more demanding
standard of review, depending on the nature of the reasons underlying the
restrictions. Consider, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 ruling in
Oyama v. University of Hawaii.104 Mark Oyama was a graduate student seeking
a degree in secondary education at the University of Hawaii.105 The school
refused to allow him to become a student teacher—an essential part of the
program—because in various writing assignments he had said adults should
be permitted to have consensual sex with children; children with severe
mental difficulties should not be placed in classrooms with non-disabled
children; teachers ordinarily should not be expected to teach children with
learning disabilities; and most kids in special-education programs are
“fakers.”106 Oyama filed suit, alleging a violation of his free-speech rights.
The district court rejected Oyama’s claim, finding that school officials’
decision was constitutionally permissible because it was reasonably related
to legitimate teaching goals.107 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, but on different
grounds. Hazelwood was irrelevant, the appellate court said, because
pedagogical objectives did not underlie the school’s refusal to let Oyama
become a student teacher. “The University’s purpose,” the court wrote,
“was not to teach Oyama any lesson; rather, it was to fulfill the University’s
own mandate of limiting certification recommendations to students who
meet the standards for the teaching profession.”108 Hawaii had “entrust[ed]
the University with the task of verifying a candidate’s ability to ‘function
effectively’ as an educator in public schools,” and school officials were
simply carrying out that task when they took the actions challenged here.109

103. Id. at 733. The Sixth Circuit remanded for trial, finding that some of the
evidence in the case suggested that the school ordinarily did not forbid students from
referring clients to other counselors and that the only reason the school did not afford Ward
the same prerogative was because they did not like her religious objections to same-sex
marriage. See id. at 735–38, 741–42; see also id. at 734 (stating that discriminating against
students because of their religious beliefs is never “a legitimate end of a public school”).
104. Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
2520 (2016).
105. Id. at 855.
106. Id. at 856–58.
107. Id. at 860–61.
108. Id. at 863.
109. Id.
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Drawing from a line of “certification cases,” the court applied a form of
heightened scrutiny to evaluate the propriety of the school’s actions and
found those actions permissible.110
2. Speech in the Larger World
When it comes to the speech of professional-school students in noncurricular settings—settings akin to B.L.’s weekend Snapchat post after she
was denied a position on her high school’s varsity cheerleading squad111—
the cases are scarce and in conflict. Courts have taken two different
approaches: one that embraces Hazelwood and one that does not.
In 2016’s Keefe v. Adams, Craig Keefe—a nursing student at Central
Lakes College—stated in a series of Facebook posts that there was “[n]ot
enough whiskey to control [his] anger” at a classmate who altered a group
project late at night, that he was going to “take this electric pencil sharpener
in this class” and puncture someone’s lung with it, and that a classmate
who complained about his Facebook posts was a “stupid bitch” who was
going to fail out of the program.112 When the program director spoke with
Keefe about the posts, she judged him to be unremorseful and “not receptive
to her concern that the posts were unprofessional.”113 Concluding that she
and her colleagues could not successfully teach Keefe the necessary
professional skills, the director expelled him from the program.114
Invoking Hazelwood, the Eighth Circuit upheld Keefe’s expulsion.115
The court found that “teaching and enforcing viewpoint-neutral professional
110. The court asked three primary questions: (1) whether “[t]he University’s decision
was directly related to defined and established professional standards,” id. at 868; (2)
“whether the University’s decision was narrowly tailored to serve the University’s purpose
of evaluating Oyama’s suitability for the teaching profession,” id. at 871, an inquiry that
included asking whether “the University based its decision only upon statements Oyama
made in the context of the certification program,” rather than statements he made out in
the larger world, id. at 872; and (3) “whether the University’s decision reflects reasonable
professional judgment about Oyama’s suitability for the teaching profession,” id. Having
touched all those bases, the court found no First Amendment violation. Id. at 874, 876.
111. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing Mahanoy Area Sch.
Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021)).
112. Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2016).
113. Id. at 527.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 525–26.
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codes of ethics are a legitimate part of a professional school’s curriculum.”116
Professional schools thus may require their students to comply with such
ethics codes, so long as they do so in a manner that is “reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”117 The court concluded that the nursing
program’s director had stayed within those boundaries.118 The program’s
student handbook stated that all students were obliged to “uphold and adhere
to” the American Nursing Association’s code of ethics and that anyone
who failed to do so would not be “eligible to progress in the nursing program.”119
The American Nursing Association’s code of ethics declared, in turn, that
nurses must maintain “respect[ful],” “compassionate and caring relationships
with colleagues and others” and must not engage in “any form of harassment
or threatening behavior.”120 The court found no reason to overturn the program
director’s conclusion that the school would not be able to teach Keefe to
obey those professionalism requirements.121
Keefe had insisted that his speech was insulated from school discipline
because he uttered it in off-campus Facebook posts and those posts were
“unrelated to any course assignment or requirements.”122 The panel majority
rejected both of those arguments. The court pointed out that a “student
may demonstrate an unacceptable lack of professionalism off campus, as
well as in the classroom.”123 As for the speech’s relationship to curricular
concerns, the court did not concede that it mattered whether the unprofessional
speech was uttered in connection with curricular activities.124 Rather, the
court simply said that the premise of Keefe’s argument was factually
mistaken. His “posts were directed at classmates, involved their conduct
in the Nursing Program, and included a physical threat related to their
medical studies”; the posts “had a direct impact on [his classmates’]
educational experience”; and the posts “had the potential to impact patient

116. Id. at 530; see also id. (“[C]ompliance with professional ethical standards is a
permissible academic requirement . . . .”). The court said that judges “should be particularly
cautious before interfering with the ‘degree requirements in the health care field when the
conferral of a degree places the school’s imprimatur upon the student as qualified to pursue
his chosen profession.’” Id. at 533 (quoting Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d
570, 576 (6th Cir. 1988)).
117. Id. at 531 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)).
118. Id. at 532.
119. Id. at 528.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 532–33.
122. Id. at 531–32.
123. Id. at 531.
124. Id. at 532.
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care” by undermining students’ ability to work together collaboratively
when trying to meet patients’ needs.125
Judge Kelly dissented, embracing much of Keefe’s argument. She contended
that Hazelwood was irrelevant because the Facebook posts occurred off
campus, they “were not made as part of fulfilling a program requirement[,
and they] did not express an intention to break specific curricular rules.”126
In her view, a trial was necessary because “[g]enuine issues of material
fact remain[ed] concerning whether the administrators could permissibly
restrict the speech at issue . . . in the manner that they did.”127
The Minnesota Supreme Court charted a different course in Tatro v.
University of Minnesota.128 Amanda Tatro was an undergraduate in the
University of Minnesota’s Mortuary Science Program. On her Facebook
page, she joked about the human cadaver she had been assigned for an anatomy
course, and she talked about using “a trocar” to vent her aggressions and
to “stab a certain someone in the throat.”129 School officials determined
that Tatro had violated program rules, including the Mortuary Science
Student Code of Professional Conduct.130 As discipline, school officials
gave her a failing grade in the anatomy course and said that, to continue
in the program, she would need to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and
take other remedial steps.131
Tatro filed suit, alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights.132
She contended that her Facebook posts were exempt from school officials’
professionalism scrutiny because she did not utter them pursuant to her
curricular responsibilities.133 University leaders took the contrary view,
arguing that Tatro’s Facebook posts were well within their disciplinary
reach so long as—per Hazelwood—they were “enforc[ing] academic program

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 543 (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 545.
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
Id. at 512. A trocar is a sharply pointed medical device. See id. at 513 n.2.
See id. at 511, 514–16.
See id. at 514–15.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 517–18.
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rules that are reasonably related to the legitimate pedagogical objective of
training Mortuary Science students to enter the funeral director profession.”134
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Tatro’s First Amendment
claim,135 but not on Hazelwood grounds. Hazelwood was inapposite, the
court said, because no one could reasonably perceive that Tatro’s Facebook
posts bore the “imprimatur” of the school,136 one of the factors that the
Hazelwood Court cited when describing the circumstances for which its
deferential standard was intended.137 Moreover, the Minnesota court reasoned,
applying Hazelwood’s standard in professional-school settings would give
school authorities unacceptably broad authority, since so much speech can
reasonably be deemed related to professionalism concerns like “courtesy”
and “respect.”138 But the court also rejected Tatro’s contention that her
Facebook comments were entirely beyond program officials’ regulatory
reach.139 The court held that school officials could discipline Tatro for her
online posts, so long as the discipline was “narrowly tailored and directly
related to established professional conduct standards.”140 The court found
that this standard had been met: Tatro violated an established professional
obligation to treat human cadavers with respect, and the school’s speech
regulations were not “substantially broader than necessary” to ensure students
met that obligation.141
****
Putting the case law’s pieces together, we find that courts have constructed
the following partial picture: Applicants to public colleges and universities
do not enjoy the Speech Clause’s protection for what they say in their
application materials or in their admissions interviews, but courts have not
yet determined whether the Speech Clause is similarly silent when school
134. Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135. The Minnesota Court of Appeals had similarly rejected Tatro’s claim and found
that Tatro’s “Facebook posts materially and substantially disrupted the work and discipline
of the university.” Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811, 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011),
aff’d, 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). The court said virtually nothing about Hazelwood
and instead relied primarily on Tinker’s “material disruption” standard. Id. at 820–21; see
also supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text (noting the Tinker standard).
136. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518.
137. See supra notes 61–72 and accompanying text (discussing Hazelwood); see also
infra note 234 (discussing Hazelwood’s use of the term “imprimatur”).
138. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 518.
139. Id. at 520–21.
140. Id. at 521.
141. Id. at 522–23 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 800 (1989)).
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officials base adverse admissions decisions on statements that applicants
have uttered out in the larger world.142 For enrolled students in all academic
units on public campuses, teachers and administrators enjoy broad latitude
to regulate curricular speech, such as statements that students make in
assigned essays and class presentations. School officials may regulate such
speech in any manner that is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
goals, bearing in mind that students’ adulthood and the overall educational
context have roles to play when determining whether pedagogical goals
are indeed legitimate.143 Faculty and administrators who train students for
professions with ethical requirements can include professionalism training
among their pedagogical objectives and can reasonably regulate their students’
speech in conventional curricular settings accordingly.144 But when those
educators extend their professionalism-driven speech regulations to speech
that students utter out in the larger world, courts have taken conflicting
approaches: one has applied the same deferential standard that applies to
ordinary curricular speech, while another has devised a heightened standard
of review.145
III. VIEWING STUDENTS’ SPEECH RIGHTS THROUGH A
PUBLIC-EMPLOYMENT LENS
On their points of agreement, have courts found the best reading of the
First Amendment’s requirements? Where they have disagreed or been silent,
how should the First Amendment analysis proceed? There are many ways
one could try to answer those questions, and I do not purport to canvass
all of them here.146 I focus instead on the insights we can glean from courts’

142. See supra Section II.A.
143. See supra Section II.B. For a discussion of how best to determine whether
speech is “curricular” in nature, see infra Section III.B.1.
144. See supra Section II.C.1.
145. See supra Section II.C.2.
146. An originalist, for example, would explore the meaning of the First Amendment
at the time of its ratification and at the time of its application to the states. See generally
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing originalists’ commitment to the proposition
that the meanings of constitutional texts are fixed at particular moments in time). For a
discussion of originalism’s notable lack of influence in Speech Clause jurisprudence, see
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construction of the First Amendment principles that define public employees’
speech rights. As I acknowledged at the outset and will briefly say more
about in a moment,147 there is at least one key difference between the work
of public institutions of higher education and the work of most governmental
employers: broad freedom of expression is essential to the former but
typically not essential to the latter. There nevertheless are features of First
Amendment public-employment law that are instructive for postsecondary
settings. Because I do not discuss all the competing analytic possibilities,
I cannot claim that the approach I propose here is the only one that courts
could reasonably take. I do contend, however, that the proposed approach
holds great appeal because it builds on relevant lessons learned from courts’
intensive activity in another free-speech domain to which useful analogies
can be drawn.
Using courts’ approach to the rights of public employees as a point of
methodological comparison, I begin with the speech rights of college
applicants and then proceed to two interrelated matters—the rights of all
postsecondary students when facing curricular speech restrictions of any
kind and the rights of professional-degree students when facing speech
regulations driven by concerns about professionalism.
A. The Speech Rights of Applicants
When it comes to statements that job applicants and college applicants
make in their respective application materials and interviews, courts have
deployed different rationales but reached the same conclusion: the Speech
Clause does not constrain the government’s ability to reject applications
that contain statements the government finds objectionable. But for statements
that college applicants make outside the application process—a matter
that courts have not yet addressed148—public-employment law suggests a
different answer. Cases from the employment arena suggest by analogy
that the Speech Clause does not permit a public postsecondary school to
deny an application based on statements that the applicant made outside
the application process unless the Speech Clause would permit the school
to expel an enrolled student for producing the same expression. I discuss

Todd E. Pettys, Hostile Learning Environments, the First Amendment, and Public Higher
Education, 54 CONN. L. REV. 1, 23–37 (2022).
147. See supra note 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 199–204 and accompanying
text.
148. See supra Section II.A.
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those matters here, after briefly setting the stage by describing the core
principles that define the First Amendment speech rights of public employees.
1. The First Amendment Framework for Public Employees
In 1977’s Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,149
the Supreme Court reminded readers that an unsuccessful applicant for
government employment has a First Amendment claim only “if the
decision not to [hire] him was made by reason of his exercise of
constitutionally protected First Amendment freedoms.”150 As that phrasing
makes clear (and as one would expect in any event), an unsuccessful job
applicant does not have a federal free-speech claim against a public
employer unless the applicant enjoys the Speech Clause’s protection
for the statements that allegedly have drawn the employer’s disapproval.
To determine whether a job applicant’s speech is indeed constitutionally
protected, courts ask whether the First Amendment would permit the
employer to take adverse action against one of its existing employees for
the same kind of speech.151 In other words, when it comes to rights under

149. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
150. Id. at 283–84 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)); accord Perry,
408 U.S. at 597 (stating that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests—especially, his interest in freedom
of speech,” and this includes “denials of public employment”). In the early twentieth
century, the Court took a far narrower view of the First Amendment protections enjoyed
by those wishing to obtain or retain government employment. See Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983) (describing the law’s evolution).
151. See Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 463 F.3d 378, 383–86
(5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a contractor need not have a preexisting relationship with a
government employer to be able to assert a First Amendment retaliation claim concerning
the contractor’s speech, and applying key portions of the analysis that governs First
Amendment retaliation claims brought by government employees); Worrell v. Henry, 219
F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2000) (“This circuit has applied the Pickering balancing [that
applies when determining employees’ First Amendment free-speech rights] to hiring
decisions. . . . Other circuits have taken the same approach.”); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d
1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997) (“We conclude that the appropriate test for evaluating the
constitutional implications of the State of Georgia’s decision . . . to withdraw Shahar’s job
offer . . . is the same test as the test for evaluating the constitutional implications of a
government employer’s decision based on an employee’s exercise of her right to free
speech, that is, the Pickering balancing test.”); Bonds v. Milwaukee County, 207 F.3d 969,
973 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying Pickering to determine whether a county could rescind a job

259

PETTYS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/18/2022 3:18 PM

the Speech Clause, applicants get what employees get. The speech rights
that employees get, in turn, are largely determined by the analytic framework
that the Supreme Court announced in its 1968 ruling in Pickering v. Board
of Education.152 The Pickering Court explained that, when a government
employee says his or her employer violated the First Amendment by treating
the employee adversely because of his or her speech, courts must strike “a
balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”153 Although public employees’ expressive freedoms are thus not
as robust as those of “the citizenry in general,”154 employees do enjoy a
significant measure of freedom to participate in public discourse without fear
of retribution in the workplace.
There are occasions, however, when the Speech Clause gives government
employees no protection at all. As I will discuss in a later subsection,
employees get no Speech Clause protection for statements they utter pursuant
to their job duties.155 The Speech Clause also does little or nothing to protect
them when they speak on matters of mere private concern.156 The distinction
offer to an applicant based on something he said while working for a different governmental
employer); Morrison v. City of Reading, No. 02-7788, 2007 WL 764034, at *6 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 9, 2007) (stating that “[p]rospective government employees and applicants for volunteer
positions as well as persons already employed in government positions enjoy First
Amendment protection” and that First Amendment retaliation claims brought by applicants are
governed by the same test that governs retaliation claims brought by government employees).
152. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
153. Id. at 568. On the employee’s side of the balance, courts should consider the
employee’s interest in contributing to society’s “free and open debate” on matters of public
significance, as well as the public’s interest in hearing what knowledgeable public employees
have to say on those matters. See id. at 573. On the employer’s side of the balance, courts
should consider whether the speech impeded the employee’s ability to do his or her job,
undermined important working relationships, or otherwise disrupted the employer’s ordinary
operations. See id. at 572–73.
154. Id. at 568.
155. See infra Section III.B.1 (discussing and drawing analogies to Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006)).
156. See Schwamberger v. Marion Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 988 F.3d 851, 856 (6th
Cir. 2021) (explaining that, to state a claim of First Amendment retaliation, a public
employee “must show that her speech touched on a matter of public concern” (citing Rose
v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 920 (6th Cir. 2002))); Falco v. Zimmer, 767 F. App’x 288, 302
(3d Cir. 2019) (“Whereas a public employee’s speech involving matters of public concern
are protected, speech involving matters of private concern are not protected.”); Sherrod v.
Bd. of St. Lucie Cnty., 635 F. App’x 667, 672 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A public employee’s
speech is not protected by the First Amendment when the employee ‘speaks not as a citizen
upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal
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between matters of public and private concern is often outcome determinative:
speech on the former gets as much protection as Pickering’s balancing test
affords, while speech on the latter typically gets no Speech Clause protection
at all. To distinguish between the two, courts examine the “content, form,
and context of” the speech157 and ask whether it was “on a subject of legitimate
news interest”158—that is, they ask whether the speech can “be fairly
considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to
the community.”159 Speech about one’s employment status or other internal
workplace matters typically falls on the private, unprotected side of the
line.160
Courts use those principles to assess the First Amendment status of
statements individuals make when applying for government employment.161
For analytic purposes, I divide those cases into two groups: those involving
statements made in application documents and job interviews and those
involving statements made outside the application process. I consider each
in turn and explain how courts’ methodologies in those settings can deepen
our understanding of the speech rights of prospective postsecondary students.
2. Statements Made in the Application Process
When it comes to statements that those seeking government employment
make in their application materials and job interviews, numerous courts
have held that applicants typically get no First Amendment protection at

interest.’” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983))); Sousa v. Roque, 578
F.3d 164, 170 (2d Cir. 2009) (“If the court determines that the plaintiff either did not speak
as a citizen or did not speak on a matter of public concern, ‘the employee has no First
Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.’”)
(quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 546 U.S. 410, 418 (2006))). In Connick, the Court indicated
in dictum that, in “the most unusual circumstances,” the First Amendment will protect
public employees’ speech on “matters of only personal interest.” See Connick, 461
U.S. at 147. But the Connick Court did not elaborate upon the kinds of circumstances that
would trigger First Amendment protection for such speech, nor has the Court since had
occasion to return to the issue. See id.
157. Connick, 461 U.S. at 145, 147–50.
158. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004).
159. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
160. See Roe, 543 U.S. at 83 (discussing Connick).
161. See supra note 151 (citing authorities).
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all.162 Whether explicitly or implicitly, these courts reason as follows.
When people speak in an effort to land a government job, they are speaking
to advance their personal interests, rather than to contribute to discourse
about matters of public concern;163 statements that applicants make in the

162. See, e.g., Wetherbe v. Smith, 593 F. App’x 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding
that, when speaking in a job interview about his belief that the faculty tenure system harms
higher education, the plaintiff “was not speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public
concern” and so could not state a claim of First Amendment retaliation); Owen v. City of
Decatur, No. 5:06-CV-366-VEH, 2006 WL 8437419, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 14, 2006)
(noting that, when commenting on the fact that she believed a government employer’s
interview process was biased against women, the plaintiff had spoken in a job interview
“as an employee during her quest for professional advancement” and thus the speech was
aimed at “further[ing] private interests” rather than discussing matters of public significance).
The purpose of the individual’s speech, and not merely the speech’s subject matter, plays
a large role in these cases. Some cases concerning the speech rights of actual employees
take a similar approach. See Myles v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 267 F. App’x 898,
900 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Though her speech did touch on a matter of public interest, the true
purpose behind Appellant’s various complaints was not to raise an issue of public concern,
but rather to further her own private interest in improving her employment position.”);
White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1059 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Even as to
an issue that could arguably be viewed as a matter of public concern, if the employee has
raised the issue solely in order to further his own employment interest, his First Amendment right
to comment on that issue is entitled to little weight in the balancing analysis.”); Rao v.
N.Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1236, 1243 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The
fundamental question is whether the employee is seeking to vindicate personal interests or
to bring to light a ‘matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.’” (quoting
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146)). Some courts have cautioned about allowing the speaker’s
motive to play too dominant a role when determining whether speech was on a matter of
public or private concern. See, e.g., Chappel v. Montgomery Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1,
131 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he argument that an individual’s personal motives
for speaking may dispositively determine whether that individual’s speech addresses a
matter of public concern is plainly illogical and contrary to the broader purposes of the First
Amendment.” (emphases added)); see also Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d
888, 894 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Since Chappel, this court has held that the subjective intent of
the speaker, while relevant, is not a controlling factor.”); cf. Alison Steinbach, Black ASU
Professor Who Claimed Retaliation for Statements on Diversity Wins Jury Verdict,
AZCENTRAL (Aug. 26, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona
-education/2021/08/26/asu-professor-nicholas-alozie-wins-jury-verdict-against-universityretaliation/8251561002/ [https://perma.cc/G4F7-SXRV] (reporting on the win at trial of a
university professor who claimed he was the target of discrimination “for stating his
opinions on diversity and criticizing hiring during a job interview”). For my purposes
here, I do not reject the possibility that, in unusual circumstances, speech in job-application
materials and job interviews might receive First Amendment protection. I merely point
out that the cases suggest such circumstances would indeed be unusual.
163. See, e.g., Owen, 2006 WL 8437419, at *5.

262

PETTYS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 229, 2022]

5/18/2022 3:18 PM

Constructing Students’ Speech Rights
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

application process are thus statements on matters of mere private concern;164
applicants get the same First Amendment protection that employees get;165
the Speech Clause allows government employers to treat employees
adversely for speech on matters of mere private concern;166 so the Speech
Clause permits public employers to reject job applicants because of statements
they make in the application process.167
In Crawford v. Columbus State Community College,168 for example,
Thomas Crawford alleged that he was unconstitutionally denied a tenured
teaching position in retaliation for statements he made in his application
materials regarding students’ desire to see him get such a post.169 The
Fifth Circuit held that Crawford failed to state a First Amendment claim
because statements he made “in his own application” fell “outside the
ambit of addressing matters of public concern.”170 In Blitzer v. Potter,171
Andrew Blitzer alleged that officials at the United States Postal Service
violated his First Amendment rights by refusing to hire him because, on
his job application forms and in his job interview, he criticized one of his
former employers.172 After explaining that free-speech claims brought by
applicants and employees are governed by the same legal standard, the
Southern District of New York found that Blitzer had “failed to make out
even a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.”173

164. See, e.g., Myles, 267 F. App’x at 900.
165. See supra note 151 (citing authorities).
166. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 162.
168. Crawford v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., 196 F. Supp. 3d 766 (S.D. Ohio 2016).
169. See id. at 774.
170. Id. The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s description of the
difference between matters of public and private concern in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138 (1983). In that case, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans had drawn the ire
of her supervisor when she circulated a questionnaire among her coworkers. Id. at 141.
The Court found that most of the questionnaire concerned only private matters—and thus
did not require further First Amendment analysis—because the questions only concerned
the employees’ own welfare. See id. at 148–49. The Court found that one inquiry on the
questionnaire did amount to speech on a matter of public concern necessitating Pickering
balancing—a question about whether assistant district attorneys felt workplace pressure to
work on election campaigns. See id. at 149–54.
171. Blitzer v. Potter, No. 03 Civ. 6124, 2005 WL 1107064 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2005).
172. See id. at *14.
173. Id. at *15.
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He had uttered the problematic statements in his application materials, the
court said, so he was speaking “only as an applicant on matters of personal
interest.”174
So far as ultimate outcomes go, that approach dovetails nicely with what
the Fourth Circuit said in Buxton v. Kurtinitis about the speech rights of
individuals who apply for seats in academic programs. Recall that Dustin
Buxton alleged that college admissions officials rejected his application
for a seat in a radiation therapy program because, during his admissions
interview, he expressed some of his religious beliefs about death.175
Recall, too, that the Fourth Circuit relied on the logic of Finley and other
Supreme Court cases involving instances in which government officials
must make content-based speech distinctions to allocate scarce resources
in competitive programs.176 Based on Finley and similar precedents, the
Fourth Circuit held that the Speech Clause gave Buxton no protection
whatsoever for the statements he made in his interview.177 Buxton thus
found himself in exactly the same position as job applicants who complain
that statements they made during their job interviews or in their application
documents were held against them. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit made that
very comparison, observing that if Buxton had been interviewing for a job
with the school rather than for a seat in its entering class, his First
Amendment claim would fail because his “speech in the interview room
was [on] a matter of personal interest: his admittance to the [program].”178
Despite that similarity in outcomes, there is an important methodological
difference between the way the Fourth Circuit resolved Buxton’s dispute
and the way courts adjudicate job applicants’ free-speech claims. Indeed,
so far as expressed analytic principles are concerned, the harmony between
the outcomes in the two sets of cases is largely coincidental. In the publicemployment setting, courts use the rights of existing employees as the
benchmark for measuring the rights of applicants. 179 When evaluating
Buxton’s speech rights, however, the Fourth Circuit did not ask whether
the Speech Clause would permit college officials to discipline or expel an
enrolled student for making statements comparable to Buxton’s. If it had,
the court almost certainly would have reached a different result. The Speech

174. Id.
175. See Buxton v. Kurtinitis, 862 F.3d 423, 425–26 (4th Cir. 2017); supra notes 40–
58 and accompanying text (discussing Buxton).
176. See Buxton, 862 F.3d at 428–31.
177. See id. at 431.
178. Id. at 427.
179. See supra notes 151–74 and accompanying text.
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Clause ordinarily would not permit a public college to treat a radiation therapy
student disadvantageously simply because, in a non-clinical setting, he
told a faculty member about his religious beliefs regarding death.180
In cases like Buxton’s, the decision to rely upon the Finley line of
cases—emphasizing the role that interviews can play in narrowing the
pool of contenders for seats in competitive academic programs—makes
good sense.181 Schools have a strong interest in trying to discern which of
their applicants are most likely to thrive in, and contribute to, their academic
programs and communities—or, as Justice Frankfurter concisely put it, to
decide “who may be admitted to study.”182 Whether on application forms
or in admissions interviews, asking applicants to speak in response to
questions is a sensible part of that screening process. But doing so has
value only if the institutions are free to make content-based distinctions
among the statements that applicants submit for evaluation.183 That remains
180. If the student uttered the statement in performance of curricular duties, the college’s
disciplinary actions would need to be reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical objective.
See infra Section III.B.1. Although that standard is deferential, our hypothetical plainly tests
deference’s limits. And if the student made the statement in a setting where that deferential
standard did not apply, the college’s actions would be “presumptively invalid” because they
would amount to a content-based regulation of speech. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations [of speech] are presumptively invalid.”).
181. See supra notes 40–58 and accompanying text (discussing the Buxton court’s
reasoning).
182. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result); see also supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text (noting Justice Frankfurter’s
influential declaration).
183. Jamal Greene makes a similar point:
A typical college or university does not choose students randomly or indiscriminately.
Rather, it makes a judgment about which students are prepared for the school’s
curriculum, have the potential to succeed within it, are likely to donate to the
school or generate revenue through athletics or other extracurricular activities,
or will contribute to the educational experiences of other students. . . . [T]his last
factor in particular incorporates judgments about the perspectives students will
bring to discussion both inside and outside the classroom. In other words,
universities engage in viewpoint discrimination in admitting students, and they
do so pervasively. . . . [T]hey are attentive to the mix of perspectives students offer and
the likely quality of their contribution to the classroom.
Jamal Greene, Constitutional Moral Hazard and Campus Speech, 61 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 223, 242–43 (2019) (footnotes omitted); cf. HORWITZ, supra note 90, at 126 (arguing
that the Supreme Court has “recognized that universities have unique institutional needs,
practices, and traditions, and should be trusted to make their own admissions decisions
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true even if the First Amendment would not give school officials the same
latitude to respond disadvantageously to the speech of individuals who have
already successfully passed through the admissions screening process and
thus are no longer subjects of the school’s pool-narrowing evaluation.
But what should happen in applicant-speech cases for which the Finley
rationale is ill-suited?
3. Statements Made Outside the Application Process
As I noted earlier, 184 the Finley rationale weakens significantly or
disappears altogether when the statements on which admissions officials
adversely rely were not submitted for evaluation by the applicant, but rather
were uttered out in the larger world. When the Finley rationale is indeed
not in play, public-employment law suggests a sensible approach. Just as
the speech rights of employees provide the relevant benchmark for determining
the speech rights of job applicants when it comes to statements they make
outside the application process, 185 we can look to the speech rights of
enrolled students to determine whether the Speech Clause shields college
and university applicants from rejection based on statements they make
outside the admissions process. If the First Amendment would not permit
a school to expel a student for an outrageous tweet or a transgressive
Facebook post, for example, why would it permit the school to reject a person’s

with minimal judicial interference”). So far as applicants’ statements are concerned, other
constitutional texts and principles protect applicants against arbitrary decision-making.
See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within
the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.”
(quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923))). Texts such
as the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause protect against invidious discrimination. There is, however, one important
role that the Speech Clause can play: undergirding applicants’ constitutional right not to
be discriminated against based on their political beliefs or associations. See Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990) (holding that the First Amendment bars
the government from refusing to hire individuals for “low-level” positions because of their
political affiliations); NAACP v. Ala. ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”). See generally Wagner v.
Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 269 (8th Cir. 2011) (distinguishing between First Amendment retaliation
claims and First Amendment claims of political discrimination).
184. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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bid for admission based on the same expression? In both instances, the
government is refusing to allow the speaker to be a member of its student
community because of the contents of his or her speech, and in both
instances the government’s justification for that refusal either is or is not
constitutionally sufficient. If the Speech Clause would not permit a school
to expel a student based on a given rationale, that rationale should find no
greater traction when the school is deciding whether to allow the speaker
to join the student body in the first place.
Discussing every circumstance in which the Speech Clause would
permit the expulsion of students because of their speech is beyond the
scope of this Article, though examples are not hard to imagine. Neither
an applicant nor an enrolled student would have a winning free-speech
claim, for example, if the reason for the school’s adverse decision was that
the student had threatened another member of the campus community
within the meaning of the Court’s “true threats” doctrine.186 Rather than
try to catalogue every such circumstance, my aim here is to propose a
methodological premise that involves all of them—namely, that the First
Amendment fates of applicants and enrolled students should be analytically
linked when evaluating statements that applicants have made outside the
application process.
One crucial point of caution is in order, however, concerning the public/
private distinction that looms so large in the public-employment setting.
Recall that, when determining the First Amendment protection that public
employees receive, courts rely heavily upon Pickering’s distinction between
speech on public and private matters, and they use that distinction when
determining the First Amendment rights of job applicants.187 That is true
even for speech that applicants utter outside the application process. In
MacFarlane v. Grasso, for example, James MacFarlane alleged that
Connecticut officials denied his application for a job with the Connecticut
Army National Guard because, in the months prior to filing his application,
he had vocally complained about the manner in which some of his prior
interactions with state figures were handled.188 Turning to Pickering and
186. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“‘True threats’ encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”).
187. See supra Sections III.A.1, III.A.2.
188. See MacFarlane v. Grasso, 696 F.2d 217, 219–20 (2d Cir. 1982).
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the speech rights of current government employees for direction, the Second
Circuit remanded so that the district court could determine whether MacFarlane’s
pre-application complaints had been on a public or private matter.189
Deploying the public/private distinction is a non-starter when it comes
to determining the speech rights of postsecondary students and applicants.
Although it is true that “[s]peech on matters of public concern is at the
heart of the First Amendment’s protection,”190 it is primarily in the publicemployment context that courts routinely give the public/private distinction
such highly consequential weight.191 Indeed, courts have disclaimed reliance
on that distinction when adjudicating the speech rights of college and
university students. The case that set that ball in motion was the Supreme
Court’s 1973 ruling in Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri.192 In Papish, the Court vindicated a graduate student’s First
Amendment right to distribute a newspaper that depicted police officers
“raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice” and that used
profane language to describe an individual’s criminal trial.193 This
undoubtedly was speech on matters of public concern, and the Court did
indeed rule in the student’s favor, but the Court said nothing at all about
the public/private distinction it had drawn five years earlier in Pickering.
Instead, the Court simply found that campus officials had impermissibly
discriminated against the student based on the contents of her speech.194
Lower tribunals have attached great significance to the Papish Court’s
decision to forego any reliance on Pickering. In Qvyjt v. Lin,195 for example,
a graduate student brought a First Amendment retaliation claim against a
group of faculty members, who in turn argued that they were entitled to
qualified immunity because the student’s speech had been on a private matter

189. See id. at 219; see also supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text (discussing
Pickering). Or imagine that a public employer refuses to hire an applicant because it has
discovered that the applicant posted nude photos of herself online. The applicant has
no claim under the Speech Clause, because her speech was on a matter of mere personal
interest. See DIANE M. JUFFRAS, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF GOV., USING THE INTERNET TO
CONDUCT BACKGROUND CHECKS ON APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT 11–12 (2010).
190. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) (plurality opinion)).
191. See, e.g., McFarlane, 696 F.2d at 223–24.
192. Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
193. Id. at 668. The story about the trial and acquittal bore the headline “Motherfucker
Acquitted.” Id.
194. See id. at 670–71.
195. Qvyjt v. Lin, 953 F. Supp. 244 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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and so fell outside the First Amendment’s protection.196 The Northern District
of Illinois rejected that defense, finding that it “was clearly established by
no later than 1973, when the Supreme Court decided Papish, that state
university officials cannot retaliate [against] or punish a graduate student
for the content of his speech, regardless of whether that speech touches
matters of public or private concern.”197 Other courts have similarly concluded
that the public/private distinction does not drive the outcome in cases
involving the speech rights of college and university students.198
That surely is the right conclusion. As I have stressed,199 broad rights
of free expression are essential to the missions of institutions of higher
education.200 The authors of the University of Chicago’s influential statement
on free speech put it well when they explained that colleges and universities
today “should be expected to provide the conditions within which hard
thought, and therefore strong disagreement, independent judgment, and
the questioning of stubborn assumptions, can flourish in an environment
of the greatest freedom.”201 The Court has similarly recognized that “[t]he

196. Id. at 245; see also supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text (discussing qualified
immunity).
197. Qvyjt, 953 F. Supp. at 249; see also id. at 247–48 (“[T]he governmental interests
present in a governmental employer-employee relationship . . . are simply not present in
the state university-student relationship before this court.”).
198. See, e.g., Guse v. Univ. of S.D., No. CIV. 08-4119-KES, 2011 WL 1256727, at
*16 (D.S.D. Mar. 30, 2011) (“[I]n the context of public university students, the Supreme
Court has not applied the public concern test.”); Castle v. Appalachian Tech. Coll., No.
2:07-CV-0104-WCO, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127106, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 16, 2008)
(“Defendants have not presented to the court a single authority that stands for the
proposition that the free speech claims of students should be held to the same standard as
those of public employees, and if there is a good reason for equating the claims, it is lost
on the court.”).
199. See supra notes 25, 147 and accompanying text.
200. See DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, FREE SPEECH AND LIBERAL EDUCATION: A
PLEA FOR INTELLECTUAL DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE 29–80 (2020) (explaining why freedom
of expression is central to the mission of modern American universities); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
SPEAK FREELY: WHY UNIVERSITIES MUST DEFEND FREE SPEECH 9–27 (2018).
201. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI. OFF. OF THE PROVOST, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 1 (2015). The authors of the Chicago Statement
elaborate on the importance of uninhibited inquiry in higher-education communities:
Because the University is committed to free and open inquiry in all matters, it
guarantees all members of the University community the broadest possible
latitude to speak, write, listen, challenge, and learn. Except insofar as limitations
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Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection,’”202 and
that “[t]eachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study
and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise
our civilization will stagnate and die.”203 Introducing Pickering’s public/
private distinction in that setting would chill vast swaths of valuable student
expression.204 When students talk to one another in the cafeteria about issues
of politics or religious faith, for example, their speech might sometimes
be more about expressing crises of self-understanding than about discussing
matters of public interest. We would inflict enormous damage on schools’
ability to serve some of their most important social functions if we required
risk-averse students to sort through the public/private distinction before
saying things that others might find upsetting, and if campus officials
on that freedom are necessary to the functioning of the University, the University of
Chicago fully respects and supports the freedom of all members of the University
community “to discuss any problem that presents itself.”
Of course, the ideas of different members of the University community will
often and quite naturally conflict. But it is not the proper role of the University
to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome,
disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the University greatly values
civility, and although all members of the University community share in the
responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about
civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off
discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to
some members of our community.
Id. at 1–2 (quoting former University of Chicago President Robert M. Hutchins). Dozens
of institutions have adopted the Chicago Statement. Chicago Statement: University and
Faculty Body Support, FIRE (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.thefire.org/chicago-statementuniversity-and-faculty-body-support/ [https://perma.cc/P86W-7TGX]. For elaboration on
the Chicago Statement by one of its principal authors, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech
on Campus: A Challenge of Our Times, in SPEECH FREEDOM ON CAMPUS: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 5, 5–19 (Joseph Russomanno ed., 2021).
202. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (quoting United States
v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
203. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion).
204. See Qvyjt v. Lin, 932 F. Supp. 1100, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“It would be
incredulous to think that the university has carte blanche to retaliate against any student as
long as the speech was of a private concern or was made to vindicate the student’s private
interest. Defendants’ position, if adopted, would have a significant chilling effect upon
students’ ability to express their opinions, beliefs and ideas.”); see also Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (“We in no sense suggest that speech on private matters falls
into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social
value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish such expression by all
persons in its jurisdiction.”).
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could discipline students for speech whenever it falls on the private side
of the line. When using the speech rights of enrolled students to determine
when prospective students can speak freely outside the admissions process
without fear of admissions repercussions, we thus must look past the public/
private distinction and focus on other, more broadly applicable First Amendment
principles.
B. The Speech Rights of Students Facing Professionalism Restrictions
I noted earlier that there are some types of speech that the First Amendment
does not require the government to tolerate, regardless of whether the
utterances occur on a public campus or in society at large—incitement and
true threats are examples.205 And, as we saw when examining Hazelwood’s
influence in postsecondary settings, numerous courts have concluded that
the First Amendment permits the government to pedagogically regulate
students’ curricular speech when it is acting in the role of postsecondary
educator.206 I now return to Hazelwood in order to think further about when
students’ speech is indeed curricular in nature and about why educators’
regulation of curricular speech deserves deference. Traveling through this
important terrain sets essential context for discussing First Amendment
limits on professional schools’ ability to respond adversely to student
speech on professionalism grounds. Once again, I start by looking to the
First Amendment law of public employment for guidance.
1. The Nature of Curricular Speech and the Grounds for Its Regulation
The analogous public-employment principle of greatest use to us here
flows from the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Garcetti v. Ceballos.207
The Garcetti Court held that the First Amendment does not protect speech
that government employees utter “pursuant to their official [job] duties.”208
The Court pointed out that the Pickering formulation was expressly
crafted to protect a public employee’s First Amendment right to speak “as
205. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Section II.B (discussing Hazelwood’s influence in collegiate settings).
207. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
208. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).
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a citizen” about public matters.209 When employees speak instead to carry
out the work that the government has hired them to perform, they are
speaking as employees and not as citizens, and so the government enjoys
all the speech-regulating prerogatives of an ordinary employer.210 The
government, in short, is entitled to get the speech it is paying for. This rule
can lead to startling outcomes when employees are punished for speech that
seems desirable in the grand scheme of things.211 But it is, indeed, the rule.
In Garcetti itself, for example, government supervisors were free to take
adverse action against Richard Ceballos for reporting his belief that law
enforcement officers filed a false affidavit to obtain a search warrant. 212
Ceballos made those statements pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor, so
the Speech Clause did not shield him from any disadvantageous actions
his employer took against him in response.213
Because so much rides on determining whether public workers are
speaking as citizens or as employees, Garcetti requires courts to take great
care when determining what an employee’s job duties genuinely entail.214
The Garcetti Court pointed out, for example, that employers cannot extend
the reach of their speech-regulating powers by writing artificially broad

209. See id. at 417–18 (emphasis added); see also supra notes 152–54 and accompanying
text (discussing Pickering).
210. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (stating that, when an employee does not speak
as a citizen, he or she “has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her
employer’s reaction to the speech”); id. (“When a citizen enters government service, the
citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.”); id. at 422–23
(“Employers have heightened interests in controlling speech made by an employee in his
or her professional capacity. . . . Supervisors must ensure that their employees’ official
communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer’s
mission.”); id. at 418 (“Government employers, like private employers, need a significant
degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little
chance for the efficient provision of public services.”).
211. See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 344 (6th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the First Amendment allowed a high school to refuse to renew the contract
of a teacher who had assigned her students the task of writing a report on why certain
books were regarded as controversial), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1038 (2011); Bradley v.
James, 479 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment allowed a campus
police officer to be fired after he told investigators that the campus chief of police might
have been drunk when responding to an incident on campus); Battle v. Bd. of Regents,
468 F.3d 755 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the First Amendment allowed a university to
refuse to renew a financial aid officer’s contract after she told the university president that
the officer’s supervisor might have been committing fraud).
212. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–21.
213. Id.
214. See id. at 424–25.
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job descriptions.215 What matters, the Court said, are “the duties an employee
actually is expected to perform.”216 Public employers’ speech-regulating
authority thereby remains tethered to its underlying rationale: courts should
allow supervisors to ensure that employees do their jobs in whatever ways
supervisors think best.
Similarly, as the Court later explained in Lane v. Franks,217 there is a
critical difference between speech one utters to carry out one’s job
responsibilities and speech one utters about one’s job or about information
obtained while doing one’s job. Edward Lane had testified in the criminal
trial of a state lawmaker regarding possible wrongdoing Lane discovered
when auditing the expenses of a government program he directed.218 After
Lane was subsequently fired, he filed a First Amendment retaliation claim.219
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Speech Clause did not protect Lane’s
testimony because it concerned matters Lane had discovered in the course
of his employment.220 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously reversed.
“Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply relates to public employment
or concerns information learned in the course of public employment,”
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court. 221 “The critical question under
Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”222
Finding that Lane was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern
when he testified, the Court deployed Pickering’s balancing test and found
his speech constitutionally protected.223
There are illuminating parallels between the Garcetti/Lane regime and
lower courts’ finding under Hazelwood that the First Amendment permits
instructors at public colleges and universities to wield broad power over
their students’ curricular speech.224 In both settings, individuals voluntarily

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 424–25.
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014).
Id. at 231–33.
Id. at 233–34.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240 (emphasis added).
Id. at 242.
See supra Section II.B (discussing Hazelwood).
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enter relationships with the government, relationships in which (a) the
government sets much of the agenda; (b) individuals agree to play specified
roles in executing that agenda; and (c) some portions of the government’s
agenda can be achieved only if the government is permitted to regulate
speech that individuals produce when executing their role-based duties.
Just as public employers decide what their employees’ job duties will include,
public educators decide what their students’ programmatic learning activities
will be. And just as public employers need the authority to regulate
employees’ job-performing speech in order to make sure the job gets done
right, public educators need the authority to supervise “expressive activities”
that can “fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum”225 in order
to make sure students “learn whatever lessons the activity is designed
to teach.”226
In both the public-employment and postsecondary-education settings,
moreover, individuals retain substantial freedom to speak outside their roles:
employees have as much expressive freedom as Pickering’s balancing test
affords when they speak as citizens on matters of public concern,227 while
students enjoy the full range of ordinary First Amendment protections when
they speak in circumstances to which Hazelwood’s deferential standard
does not apply.228 When determining whether employees and students are
speaking pursuant to their role-based duties, therefore, the First Amendment
stakes can be enormous.
When students challenge their instructors’ pedagogical responses to speech
that they produced pursuant to their duties as students, it is virtually
inconceivable that courts would apply anything other than a highly
225. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
226. Id.; see also id. (stating that deference to teachers’ pedagogically motivated
speech restrictions is appropriate when the speech is uttered in activities that are “designed
to impart particular knowledge or skills”). Two rationales offered by the Hazelwood Court
for deferring to school officials’ judgments about student speech will rarely be relevant on
college campuses. First, the Court said that school officials should be permitted to ensure
that students “are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity.” Id. But the Court has never permitted concerns about adults’ immaturity to
justify speech restrictions in society at large, and there is no reason to proceed differently
when the restrictions are imposed in campus communities. Second, the Court said schools
need to ensure that students’ speech is “not erroneously attributed to the school.” Id. This
might occasionally be relevant in postsecondary settings—perhaps when dealing with a
school’s yearbook, for example—but not often. When a student is writing a seminar paper,
talking with classmates in a study group, or posting messages on Facebook, for example,
suspicions of institutional authorship will not reasonably arise.
227. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
228. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 266–67.
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deferential standard of review. As Hazelwood pointed out, education is
primarily the business of educators, “not of federal judges.”229 The Court
made a similar point in Garcetti, emphasizing that the First Amendment
does not “empower [public employees] to ‘constitutionalize the employee
grievance.’”230 The Garcetti Court refused to adopt a rule that
would commit state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role,
mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among government
employees and their superiors in the course of official business. This displacement
of managerial discretion by judicial supervision finds no support in our
precedents.231

Just as “there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public
services” if government employers did not have “a significant degree of
control over their employees’ words and actions,”232 teachers at public colleges
and universities could not effectively perform their teaching functions if
students could bring plausible First Amendment free-speech claims each
time they were disappointed with a grade or felt an instructor had not
given their curricular expression its due.233
Taking public-employment cases as our guide, a legal standard for public
colleges and universities thus comes into focus. Courts should defer to
postsecondary educators’ pedagogical regulation of student speech—that

229. Id. at 273; cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll.
of L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (“Cognizant that judges lack the on-the-ground
expertise and experience of school administrators, . . . we have cautioned courts in various
contexts to resist ‘substituting their own notions of sound educational policy for those of
the school authorities which they review.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982), superseded by statute, Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act Amendments, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1500 (original version at ch. 30, §§ 1400–1487, 111
Stat. 37–157 (1997))). The 1997 amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) overruled Rowley’s “some benefit” standard and required “an
[individual education plan] to confer ‘meaningful educational benefit’ gauged in relation
to the potential of the child at issue.” Deal v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. Of Educ., 392 F.3d 840,
862 (6th Cir. 2004).
230. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 154 (1983)).
231. Id. at 423.
232. Id. at 418.
233. Cf. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 100 (2008) (“[I]nstitutions of higher education must
necessarily evaluate the content and quality of speech in order to perform their function.”).
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is, student speech is genuinely curricular in nature—only when students
produced that speech to carry out their duties in faculty-prescribed learning
activities. If that is the capacity in which students have spoken on a given
occasion, then judicial deference to instructors’ pedagogical responses is
likely appropriate because it enables instructors to execute the school’s
educational agenda, an agenda that students embraced when they voluntarily
enrolled in the academic program. If that is not the capacity in which students
have spoken, then Hazelwood deference is inappropriate because, for First
Amendment purposes, students have spoken simply as citizens, akin to
public employees who have spoken outside the scope of their job duties.
Some student speech is easily classified. When students give class
presentations, contribute to classroom discussions, or write answers to
examination questions, for example, they clearly are speaking pursuant to
their responsibilities as students in faculty-prescribed learning activities.
Instructors ask students to speak in these ways to help them learn—and to
determine whether they have indeed learned—whatever the instructors
aim to teach them.234 So long as instructors’ responses to the speech are (as
234. We might even say that, if faculty do not respond to the student speech with a
message of correction or disapproval in these instances, the speech “bear[s] the imprimatur
of the school.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). Hazelwood’s
use of the word “imprimatur” has created some confusion in important quarters. I take it
as clear, when read in context, that the Court used that term in two complementary senses:
it encompasses speech that some might reasonably perceive to be the school’s own
expression and it also encompasses speech that some might reasonably perceive to be
student-authored expression that enjoys the school’s approval. See id. at 271–72 (speaking
of a school’s need to ensure that “the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously
attributed to the school” as well as a school’s need “to set high standards for the student
speech that is disseminated under its auspices”); see also WEBSTER ’ S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1137 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002) (defining imprimatur
as “a sign or mark of approval”). It is the second of those two senses that I have in mind
here. Before his elevation from the Third Circuit to the Supreme Court, however, thenJudge Alito wrote an opinion taking a narrower view of Hazelwood’s use of the term
“imprimatur.” He wrote that Hazelwood’s deferential standard is appropriate only when
the speech at issue could be perceived as the school’s own speech. See Saxe v. State Area
Coll. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 213–14 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that “Hazelwood’s permissive
‘legitimate pedagogical concern’ test governs only when a student’s school-sponsored
speech could reasonably be viewed as speech of the school itself”); see also id. at 214
(“Under Hazelwood, a school may regulate school-sponsored speech (that is, speech that
a reasonable observer would view as the school’s own speech) on the basis of any
legitimate pedagogical concern.”). Judge Alito drew that interpretation from remarks the
Court made in Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819 (1995). See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213–14 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833–34). In
the Rosenberger passage that Judge Alito quoted, however, the Court was merely contrasting
the government’s own speech and private individuals’ speech in limited public forums; the
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the Hazelwood Court put it) “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns,”235 judicial deference to those responses is appropriate.
The standard proposed here helps us sort through other scenarios, as
well. Suppose, for example, that students gather in the hallway after class
one day to talk about the course material, or they meet in a coffee shop
later that night for the same purpose. And suppose their instructor later
finds out that one of the students made certain statements during the
conversation—statements that, in the instructor’s judgment, present a
good teaching opportunity. If the instructor takes adverse action against
the student for pedagogical purposes and the student responds with a First
Amendment retaliation claim, Hazelwood deference to the instructor’s
action is improper. Even though the instructor may have acted based on
reasonable pedagogical concerns, the student did not utter the speech
pursuant to faculty-prescribed course requirements. The instructor did not
ask students to conduct the conversation in which the student made his or
her statements. The speech is thus akin to that of a government employee
who speaks about her job or about information she obtained while doing
her job, but who nevertheless is not executing the duties of her job when
she speaks. Like that employee, our student here is speaking simply as a
citizen. The student’s First Amendment retaliation claim might or might
not have merit, but Hazelwood deference should not play into the analysis.
Other scenarios will require a more fact-intensive examination akin to
the analysis courts sometimes conduct to determine what a public employee’s
duties actually are. Suppose, for example, that an instructor divides her
students into groups and assigns each group the task of making a class
presentation. The students in one of the groups meet over the weekend to
discuss their presentation plans, and during that discussion one of the
students makes a statement that the group’s other members relay to the

Court did not purport to describe the extent of Hazelwood’s reach. Nor does Hazelwood itself
clearly invite Judge Alito’s interpretation: readers of the student newspaper in that case
might have believed that the school approved of the newspaper’s contents—and that the
newspaper was thus an unobjectionable product of the school’s curriculum—but they
likely would not have believed that stories attributed to student authors were really the
speech of the school itself. I proceed here under the broader reading of Hazelwood—one
that sees the possibility of school approval as a factor indicating that Hazelwood’s deferential
standard is appropriate.
235. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273.
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instructor. Can the instructor respond to the speech adversely for pedagogical
purposes, confident that she is proceeding within the bounds of Hazelwood
deference? It depends.
Just as it is up to employers to define the job duties to which Garcetti’s
deference regime attaches, universities and their faculties have broad
latitude to decide what to teach and how to teach it.236 If instructors extend
the reach of their pedagogy beyond traditional student-faculty encounters,
the reach of Hazelwood deference should extend along with it. Perhaps
our instructor here created the group assignment so that (among other things)
she can use the presentation-preparation process to teach skills of teamwork
and collaboration. If that is the case, the students’ course duties include
interacting with one another in their weekend meeting, and the instructor
should have all the leeway that Hazelwood affords to pedagogically respond
to that speech. Syllabi, published grading criteria, class announcements,
mechanisms for monitoring students’ performance when students interact
outside the instructor’s presence, and the like can all help substantiate an
instructor’s claim that a given expressive activity is indeed among his or
her students’ responsibilities.
But if those students are not obliged to engage in those interactions and
their sole faculty-prescribed duty is to make the class presentation together
—that is, if the instructor’s teaching is focused entirely on the presentation,
such that students are permitted to decide how to prepare or whether to
prepare at all—then it is only the instructor’s assessment of the presentation
that falls within the Hazelwood rule. The speech that students produce
during their weekend conversation is now the speech of mere citizens
talking about their course obligations or about information they obtained
while carrying out those course obligations. Their speech, in other words,
is akin to Edward Lane’s.237
When determining which speaking activities are duties and which are
not, Garcetti reminds us not to mistake form for substance. Just as a public
employer cannot extend its speech-regulating power by writing artificially
broad job descriptions that do not fairly describe what employees are actually
paid to do,238 an instructor cannot claim that expressive activities are among
his or her students’ course obligations when, in fact, they are not. Hazelwood
deference is not brought into play, for example, merely because an instructor
encourages his or her students to study or prepare together or writes a syllabus
236. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (noting Justice Frankfurter’s description
of the “four essential freedoms of a university”).
237. See supra notes 217–23 and accompanying text (discussing Lane).
238. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing this portion of Garcetti).
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declaring that he or she may pedagogically regulate any course-related
statements that a student makes on any occasion. Such declarations have
no greater power to transform citizen speech into role-performing speech
than does a comparable declaration in a public employee’s overly broad
job description. Life itself, after all, is neither a job obligation nor a facultyprescribed learning opportunity. The focus belongs on activities that schools
and instructors say students must complete in order to meet the requirements
of their courses and academic programs. Even if acting with the best
pedagogical intentions, instructors who adversely regulate student speech
outside those parameters are properly at risk of having their actions judicially
evaluated without the benefits of Hazelwood deference.239
Might it nevertheless be possible for the leaders of at least some
academic programs to conclude that the knowledge and skills they aim to
teach pervade so many life activities that, in some ways, life itself is a
learning opportunity,240 and school officials should have broad leeway to
regulate students’ on- and off-campus speech accordingly? That question
takes us to the speech-regulating power of professional schools.
2. Students in Professional-Degree Programs
When the Supreme Court rejected a public high school’s effort to punish
B.L. for her profane Snapchat post about cheerleading,241 one of the reasons
it cited concerned the implications of allowing K-12 schools to regulate
their students’ speech twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. “From
the student speaker’s perspective,” Justice Breyer wrote for the Court,

239. Cf. supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text (discussing pretextual justifications).
240. Cf. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of L. v.
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 686 (2010) (“A college’s commission—and its concomitant
license to choose among pedagogical approaches—is not confined to the classroom, for
extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process.”).
241. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing Mahanoy Area Sch.
Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021)).
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regulations of off-campus speech, when coupled with regulations of on-campus
speech, include all the speech a student utters during the full 24-hour day. That
means courts must be more skeptical of a school’s efforts to regulate off-campus
speech, for doing so may mean the student cannot engage in that kind of speech
at all.242

Concerns about non-stop surveillance are certainly no less acute when
the students are adults—adults immersed, no less, in academic programs
that encourage deeper engagement with the surrounding world. As the
Supreme Court put it more than half a century ago, “First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive.”243 That is at least as true among college
and university students as it is among other segments of society.244 Yet
breathing space is scarce indeed if student expression is under instructors’
ceaseless supervision.
But some academic programs might be unusually suitable for a wideranging pedagogical approach. To spark one’s thinking about such matters,
consider a private school that trains students for religious vocations. The
First Amendment does not apply here, of course, but that does not prevent
us from making an important observation about the nature of the program.
We can readily imagine ways in which the program’s leaders might expect
their students to conduct themselves, no matter what the occasion or
circumstances. The Duke Divinity School, for example, has a “Code of
Ethics for Social Media,” which states in pertinent part:
We, the faculty and students in the Divinity School of Duke University, commit
to maintain a code of ethics concerning our speech and activity on social media
networks. We commit to tell the truth, to be honest and fair, to be accurate, and
to be respectful. We also commit to be accountable for any mistakes and correct
them promptly. We will be cognizant of the fact that social media exists in a
public forum, and hence we will be cautious and responsible about what we put
out in the public sphere.245

Public colleges and universities do not have programs aimed at training
students for ministerial careers,246 but they do often have programs that
prepare students for professions whose practitioners are expected to carry

242. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2021).
243. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
244. See supra notes 25, 199–204 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of free expression in college communities).
245. Conduct Covenant, DUKE DIVINITY SCH., https://divinity.duke.edu/for-students/
academic-resources/conduct-covenant [https://perma.cc/8ZQ7-79L9].
246. See U.S. C ONST . amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion . . . .”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 14–16 (1947)
(finding that states are bound by the Establishment Clause).
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out their work under broad, speech-related ethical constraints. In its official
commentary on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example,
the American Bar Association states that, when “participating in bar
association, business or social activities in connection with the practice
of law,” lawyers must not engage in “harmful verbal . . . conduct that manifests
bias or prejudice towards others.”247 In its Principles of Ethics and Code
of Professional Conduct, the American Dental Association states that dentists
have an “obligation to provide a workplace environment that supports
respectful and collaborative relationships for all those involved in oral
health care.”248 The American Nurses Association’s Code of Ethics declares
that “[t]he nurse creates an ethical environment and culture of civility and
kindness, treating colleagues, coworkers, employees, students, and others
with dignity and respect.”249
Suppose a professional school decides that, to educate students about
those or other ethical standards, it will regulate students’ on- and off-campus
speech in various relevant ways.250 A nursing or dental school, for example,
might require its students to speak to one another with “respect” no matter
where or when they find themselves in communication with one another,
while a law school might monitor its students’ in- and out-of-class interactions
for signs of “bias or prejudice.” So that we can focus specifically on issues
concerning Hazelwood deference, assume that a school manages to express
those sorts of expectations in a manner that is sufficiently clear and welltailored to avoid problems of vagueness and overbreadth.251 If a student
247. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4 cmts. 3–4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). This
rule raises substantial First Amendment concerns that I do not address here. See, e.g.,
Greenberg v. Haggerty, 491 F. Supp. 3d 12, 30 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (“The Court finds that the
Amendments, Rule 8.4(g) and Comments 3 and 4, are viewpoint-based discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment.”).
248. PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS & CODE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.F (AM. DENTAL ASS’N
2020).
249. CODE OF ETHICS FOR NURSES r. 1.5 (AM. NURSES ASS’N 2015).
250. See supra Section II.C (discussing cases involving such regulations).
251. The assumption I ask readers to make here is a large one. See Azhar Majeed,
Defying the Constitution: The Rise, Persistence and Prevalence of Campus Speech Codes,
7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481, 543 (2009) (“Speech codes facing constitutional challenges
have been uniformly struck down in recognition of the fact that they violate the
fundamental expressive rights of students. As these cases have demonstrated, speech
codes are constitutionally infirm on the grounds of overbreadth, vagueness, content-based
and viewpoint-based discrimination, or a combination thereof.”). See generally United
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violates those expectations on Facebook, on Twitter, or elsewhere, does the
First Amendment permit school officials to respond adversely so long as
the response is—as the Hazelwood Court put it—“reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns”?252
Taking guidance from Garcetti and Lane, I have argued that courts should
defer to postsecondary educators’ pedagogical regulation of student speech
only when students produced that speech to carry out their duties in facultyprescribed learning activities. 253 When learning activities are ones that
instructors have created and assigned—such as a seminar paper, a class
presentation, or a group project for which the instructors announce that
they will pedagogically evaluate the students’ interactions—it is clear that
the instructors can include professionalism standards among the things
they aim to teach and can pedagogically respond on professionalism
grounds to speech that the students produce when carrying out the activity.
As the Eleventh Circuit found in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,254 teaching
students to comply with a profession’s ethical requirements is undoubtedly a
legitimate pedagogical goal.255
The harder cases are those in which schools seek to impose professionalism
standards for speech that students produce outside activities that instructors
themselves have created and assigned. 256 Recognizing that “[a] student
may demonstrate an unacceptable lack of professionalism off campus, as
well as in the classroom,”257 can schools wishing to teach students relevant
ethical standards designate wide swaths of out-of-class interactions as learning

States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“According to our First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
speech.”); id. at 304 (“A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute under
which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory
enforcement.” (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000))).
252. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); see supra notes
61–72 and accompanying text (discussing Hazelwood).
253. See supra text following note 233 (arriving at this formulation).
254. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
255. Id. at 876; see also supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing Keeton).
256. See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing such cases). Some commentators take a
hard line against permitting schools to regulate such speech. See, e.g., Emily Deyring,
Comment, “Professional Standards” in Public University Programs: Must the Court Defer
to the University on First Amendment Concerns?, 50 SETON HALL L. REV. 237, 247 (2019)
(“Academic evaluation should not extend to student speech made in a private capacity offcampus, which is otherwise protected by the First Amendment.”).
257. Keefe v. Adams, 840 F.3d 523, 531 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
1448 (2017); see also supra notes 112–27 and accompanying text (discussing Keefe).
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activities, and pedagogically charge students with the duty of obeying
specified ethical standards in those interactions? Can a school, in other
words, prescribe life itself as part of its curriculum, such that a large
quantity of off-campus student speech is rendered curricular in nature and
thus susceptible to schools’ pedagogically reasonable regulation?
If we turn once again to the law of public employment for direction, we
will not find this path entirely foreclosed. Some government employees,
after all, can be assigned speech-related duties that cover a broad range of
human encounters. A government department presumably could tell its
salaried spokesperson, for example, that her job includes always presenting the
department’s work in a favorable light when speaking about the department in
public settings.258 Such an employee might give a wonderful performance at
a press conference but nevertheless find herself out of a job if she then
goes to her daughter’s basketball game and tells those in the stands around
her that her office is a ship of fools.259 For pedagogical reasons, a professional
school might wish to cast a similarly broad net when designating the
circumstances in which students—on pain of unhappy consequences—are
expected to conform their speech and behavior to the profession’s ethical
standards.
For help in determining whether the Speech Clause allows educators to
chart such a course, let us return to where we began: the Court’s 2021
ruling in Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L.260 Recall that the Court in
that case held that the First Amendment barred a public high school from
disciplining one of its students for her profane Snapchat post regarding
the school’s cheerleading program.261 Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice
Alito filed a concurring opinion, proposing ways to close some of the
jurisprudential gaps that Justice Breyer’s majority opinion left open.262 “I start,”

258. See supra notes 207–16, 222–26 and accompanying text (discussing Garcetti).
259. Cf. Disabato v. S.C. Ass’n of Sch. Adm’rs, 746 S.E.2d 329, 342 (S.C. 2013)
(“[A] public employee speaking in the course and scope of her duties as a spokesperson
for the government’s message has no First Amendment right to avoid restrictions on that
speech.”).
260. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
261. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing Mahanoy).
262. See Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2048 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I join
the opinion of the Court but write separately to explain my understanding of the Court’s
decision and the framework within which I think cases like this should be analyzed.”).
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Justice Alito wrote, “with this threshold question: Why does the First
Amendment ever allow the free-speech rights of public school students to
be restricted to a greater extent than the rights of other juveniles who do
not attend a public school?”263 He concluded that the answer “must be that
by enrolling a child in a public school, parents consent on behalf of the child
to the relinquishment of some of the child’s free-speech rights.”264 With
respect to the facts of the case before him, Justice Alito found that, “whatever
B.L.’s parents thought about what she did, it is not reasonable to infer that
they gave the school the authority to regulate her choice of language when
she was off school premises and not engaged in any school activity.”265
If adults can agree to give a public school the authority to regulate their
children’s speech, they certainly can agree to give a public school the authority
to regulate speech of their own. Justice Alito made that very point:
This understanding is consistent with the conditions to which an adult would
implicitly consent by enrolling in an adult education class run by a unit of state
or local government. If an adult signs up for, say, a French class, the adult may
be required to speak French, to answer the teacher’s questions, and to comply
with other rules that are imposed for the sake of orderly instruction. 266

When a professional school wishes to regard a broad range of ordinary human
encounters as learning activities, thereby extending its speech-regulating power
beyond activities that instructors create and assign for their own teaching
purposes, Justice Alito’s approach thus would have us pose the First
Amendment inquiry this way: Can we reasonably say that, by enrolling in the
school’s academic program, students at least implicitly agreed that such
regulation would be part of the curriculum?
That question, it turns out, fits nicely within our description of features
that the Garcetti/Lane and Hazelwood regimes share. Recall that, in publicemployment and postsecondary-education settings alike, individuals voluntarily
enter relationships with the government—relationships in which the
government sets much of the agenda, individuals agree to play specified
roles in executing that agenda, and some portions of that agenda can be
achieved only if the government is permitted to regulate speech that individuals
produce when executing their role-based duties.267 When a school seeks

263. Id. at 2049–50.
264. Id. at 2051; see also id. at 2054 (“[T]he question that courts must ask is whether
parents who enroll their children in a public school can reasonably be understood to have
delegated to the school the authority to regulate the speech in question.”).
265. Id. at 2058.
266. Id. at 2051.
267. See supra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
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to regulate student speech beyond the scope of instructor-created learning
activities, we are prodded to take a close look at the specifics of the arrangement.
What, precisely, is the nature of the governmental relationship that students
voluntarily entered? What agenda was the relationship formed to serve?
Is the relationship one in which, for agenda-executing purposes, students’
on- and off-campus speech can be broadly regulated on pedagogical grounds?
Or is the school now imposing an agenda that was never part of what
students signed up for in the first place?
Those, of course, are factual questions, the answers to which will vary
from program to program. We cannot say as a categorical matter that all
professional schools do or do not have the power to regulate out-of-class
speech on professionalism grounds. At some schools, for example, the
facts might show that students entered a relationship in which schools’ regulatory
reach extends to some of the interactions that students have with the public
at large; some schools’ off-campus reach might extend only to students’
interactions with one another; and some schools’ reach might extend no
further than the learning activities that instructors have themselves created
and assigned.
How do we distinguish one such program from another? Justice Alito
again provides guidance. Focusing on schoolchildren and public K-12 schools,
he argues that “the question that courts must ask is whether parents who
enroll their children in a public school can reasonably be understood to
have delegated to the school the authority to regulate the speech in question.”268
In the cases of interest to us here, we would ask whether a reasonable student
would have understood that the program in which the student speaker
enrolled was one in which school officials could pedagogically regulate
speech of the sort at issue in the given case. What a reasonable student would
understand will depend primarily on how a school designs, markets, and
implements its programs. But simply including pertinent language in a
student handbook should probably never be sufficient. That is not how
students ordinarily discover the instructor-created occasions on which their
speech will be pedagogically evaluated, and it should not be how students
are expected to discover that school officials might pedagogically respond
to student speech in circumstances far removed from the classroom.

268.

Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 141 S. Ct. at 2054 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Because the First Amendment stakes for students here are so high—they
face the prospect of having large quantities of their off-campus speech
regulated by school officials—the school should carry the burden of proving
that a reasonable student would have understood that the school could
extend its reach to the speech in a given case, and the weight of that burden
should be substantial. As the Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he function of any standard of proof is to “instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.” By informing the
factfinder in this manner, the standard of proof allocates the risk of erroneous
judgment between the litigants and indicates the relative importance society
attaches to the ultimate decision.269

The “clear and convincing” standard of proof is appropriate here. Sitting
on the spectrum between proof by a mere preponderance of the evidence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the “clear and convincing” standard
requires the litigant on whom the burden is placed to show that “the truth
of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable.’”270 A mere preponderance
standard would be appropriate if money damages were the only thing at
stake, because “application of [that standard] indicates both society’s ‘minimal
concern with the outcome,’ and a conclusion that the litigants should ‘share
the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.’”271 The “clear and convincing”
standard, in contrast, is appropriate “when the individual interests at stake
in a state proceeding are both ‘particularly important’ and ‘more substantial
than mere loss of money,’” such as when a litigant faces a significant
deprivation of liberty.272 Only a clear and convincing showing should suffice

269. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 315–16 (1984) (quoting In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
270. Id. at 316.
271. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
272. Id. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424). The Santosky Court concluded
that “[b]efore a State may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their
natural child, due process requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and
convincing evidence.” Id. at 747–48. Not all cases drawing the “clear and convincing”
standard, however, concern matters as dire as that. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Wash. Dep’t of
Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 689 (Wash. 2001) (“[T]he Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence in a medical disciplinary proceeding.”). But cf. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs
v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 228–30 (N.D. 2007) (noting that the appropriate standard of
proof in medical disciplinary proceedings is a point of disagreement among courts, and
concluding that a mere preponderance standard is appropriate).
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to strip postsecondary students of their freedom to speak in ways that
ordinarily would lie beyond a school’s regulatory reach.
On the approach proposed here, litigation thus would proceed as follows.
If a student made a prima facie showing that his or her school adversely
responded to speech outside the scope of any instructor-created learning
activity, the burden would shift to the school to prove it was highly probable
that a reasonable student would have understood that the school could
regulate student speech in circumstances like the plaintiff’s. If the school
carried its burden on that point, the court would then deferentially permit
the school to regulate the speech in any manner reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical objectives, including objectives concerning ethical
constraints individuals face in the profession for which the student-plaintiff
was training. But if the school could not carry its proof burden, the student
would receive all the protection that the First Amendment provides to adults
in society at large, and the court would give no deference to the school’s
speech-regulating actions.273
IV. CONCLUSION
Many had hoped the Supreme Court would use its ruling in Mahanoy
Area School District v. B.L.274 to clarify the First Amendment status of
speech that K-12 students produce off campus, whether on social media
or elsewhere.275 Had the Court done so, we would know much more today
about the constitutional principles that govern free-speech disputes in public
elementary and secondary schools, and we might also be better equipped

273. Clay Calvert takes an entirely different approach to these disputes. He proposes
that courts resolve them using a multifactor test involving what he calls “the Precision
Principle,” “the Essentiality Principle,” “the Contextuality Principle,” and “the Proportionality
Principle.” See Clay Calvert, Professional Standards and the First Amendment in Higher
Education: When Institutional Academic Freedom Collides with Student Speech Rights,
91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 611, 648 (2017).
274. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021).
275. See, e.g., Amy Howe, Student’s Snapchat Sets Up Major Ruling on School
Speech, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 27, 2021, 1:37 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/
students-snapchat-sets-up-major-ruling-on-school-speech/ [https://perma.cc/ME2N-FZSP]
(“In the internet era, in which cellphones and social media are omnipresent and many
schools and parents worry about cyberbullying, the [C]ourt’s ruling in Mahanoy Area
School District v. B.L. could become a landmark decision on student speech.”).
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to navigate comparable areas of uncertainty in higher education. The
Court nevertheless chose the path of patience, resolving the case before it
on fact-intensive grounds that leave us almost as much in the dark as we
were before.276
In this Article, I have focused on some of the First Amendment
uncertainties that persist in the world of higher education. I have focused
on two questions in particular. First, does the Speech Clause permit public
undergraduate, graduate, and professional programs to deny applications
for admission because of the applicants’ speech on social media or in any
other forum? Second, does the Speech Clause permit public professional
schools (such as schools offering degrees in law, nursing, or dentistry) to
discipline students for speech that violates those professions’ ethical standards?
To help lay the groundwork for my treatment of the second of those two
questions, I also have inquired about the speech rights of undergraduate,
graduate, and professional students in curricular settings of all kinds.
Guided in large part by the comparatively well-developed First Amendment
law of public employment, the Article reaches three sets of conclusions.
First, the Speech Clause does not constrain the ability of public colleges
and universities to reject applicants based on things they say in their application
materials and interviews. But when it comes to statements that applicants
make outside the application process—whether on Snapchat, Facebook, or
elsewhere—the Speech Clause does not allow a school to deny an application
based on the applicant’s speech unless the Speech Clause would permit
the school to expel an enrolled student for the same expression. The speech
rights of government employees are commonly used as a benchmark
for determining the speech rights of applicants for government jobs, and
a comparable approach for those seeking seats in public colleges’ and
universities’ entering classes commends itself here.277
Second, both in the realm of public employment and in the realm of public
postsecondary education, individuals have voluntarily entered relationships
with the government—relationships in which the government sets much
of the agenda, individuals agree to play specified roles in executing that
agenda, and key portions of that agenda can be achieved only if the government
is permitted to regulate speech that individuals produce when executing
their role-based duties. Just as public employers need the authority to regulate
employees’ job-performing speech in order to make sure the job is done

276. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s ruling in
Mahanoy).
277. See supra Section III.A.
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right, public educators need the authority to supervise students’ curricular
speech in order to make sure students learn whatever lessons the school is
trying to teach. Courts should thus defer to postsecondary educators’
pedagogical regulation of student speech only when students produced
that speech to carry out their duties in faculty-prescribed learning activities.
If that is not the capacity in which a student has spoken, then deference to
educators’ pedagogical judgments is inappropriate because, for First
Amendment purposes, the student has spoken simply as a citizen, akin to
a public employee who has spoken outside the scope of his or her job
responsibilities.278
Third, when a professional school attempts to teach that profession’s
ethical standards by regulating students’ on- and off-campus speech beyond
the speech necessary to complete learning activities that instructors have
themselves created and assigned, courts must look carefully at the nature
of the relationship that students voluntarily entered when enrolling at that
particular school. Is it a relationship in which, by enrolling, students have
at least implicitly agreed that broad swaths of their lives will be designated
as learning activities and that their speech in those activities can be
pedagogically regulated accordingly? Or is the scope of the relationship
narrower than that? To answer those questions, courts should ask what a
reasonable student would have understood when enrolling in the program.
Because the stakes for students’ First Amendment freedoms are so high,
a court should not defer to a school’s pedagogical regulation of speech beyond
the scope of instructor-assigned learning activities unless the school can
show by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable student would
have understood that such regulation is part of the program. If the school
carries that burden, then it should be permitted to regulate the speech in
any manner reasonably calculated to achieve legitimate pedagogical goals.
Those goals may include teaching students about the ethical obligations
of individuals who work in the profession for which the students are training.
But if the school fails to show by clear and convincing evidence that a
reasonable student would have known that speech of the given sort was
within the school’s reach, then the student should receive all the protection
that the First Amendment provides to adults in society at large.279
278.
279.

See supra Section III.B.1.
See supra Section III.B.2.
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